In Milione v. City Univ. of N.Y., 2017 (App. Div. 2d Dept. Aug. 23, 2017), the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims.
Plaintiff, an Italian American, initially sued in federal court, alleging that “defendants discriminated and retaliated against him based on his national origin and his advocacy for Italian Americans.” The federal court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws. Plaintiff then sued in state court. The state court held taht plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims were barred under the doctrine of “collateral estoppel.”
The Appellate Division explained that doctrine:
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, a narrower species of res judicata, precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same” (Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500). “Collateral estoppel comes into play when four conditions are fulfilled: (1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits” (Conason v Megan Holding, LLC, 25 NY3d 1, 17; see Clifford v County of Rockland, 140 AD3d 1108, 1109). “The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel has the burden to show the identity of the issues, while the party trying to avoid application of the doctrine must establish the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate[.] …
Where a federal court declines to exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s state law claims, collateral estoppel may still bar those claims provided that the federal court decided issues identical to those raised by the plaintiff’s state claims[.]
Applying the law, the court held:
In the federal action, the District Court determined that the defendants had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their employment actions, they were not motivated by retaliatory animus, their reasons were not a pretext for discrimination, and the plaintiff was not treated differently than other employees (see Milione v City University of New York, 950 F Supp 2d 704 [SD NY]). The Second Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court (see Milione v City University of New York, 567 Fed Appx 38 [2d Cir]). As such, the determinations rendered by the federal courts are dispositive of the plaintiff’s claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL, even under the broader standard of NYCHRL (see Simmons-Grant v Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 116 AD3d 134, 139; cf. Ji Sun Jennifer Kim v Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLP, 120 AD3d at 23).
Under the circumstances, the defendants met their burden of demonstrating that the issues raised in this action are identical to those decided against the plaintiff in the federal action. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff’s claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel