In Matter of Gifford v Mccarthy, 2016 NY Slip Op 00230 (App. Div. 3d Dept. Jan. 14, 2016), the Appellate Division, Third Department held that the NYS Division of Human Rights properly found an upstate farm guilty of an unlawful discriminatory practice based on sexual orientation.
This decision provides useful guidance on, among other things, what venues qualify as a “place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” within the meaning of the New York State Human Rights Law.
Among the pertinent facts:
In October 2011, respondents Melisa McCarthy and Jennifer McCarthy — a same-sex couple — became engaged to be married. Approximately a year later, Melisa McCarthy spoke with Cynthia Gifford on the telephone concerning Liberty Ridge as a venue for her wedding ceremony and reception. During their conversation, Melisa McCarthy used the female pronoun to refer to her fiancée, thus indicating that she was engaged to a woman. Cynthia Gifford promptly interjected that there was “a problem” and that the farm did “not hold same[-]sex marriages.” In response to Melisa McCarthy’s query as to the reason for not allowing same-sex marriages, Cynthia Gifford explained that “it’s a decision that my husband and I have made that that’s not what we wanted to have on the farm.”
First, the court rejected petitioners’ argument that the farm was not a “place of public accommodation” within the meaning of the State Human Rights Law:
Executive Law § 292 (9) defines ‘place of public accommodation, resort or amusement’ inclusively and illustratively, not specifically, and sets forth an extensive list of examples of places within the statute. Such term includes establishments dealing with goods or services of any kind and any place where food is sold for consumption on the premises. Over the years, the statutory definition has been expanded repeatedly, provid[ing] a clear indication that the Legislature used the phrase place of public accommodation in the broad sense of providing conveniences and services to the public and that it intended that the definition of place of accommodation should be interpreted liberally.
Here, Liberty Ridge’s wedding facilities fall comfortably within the broad definition of “place of public accommodation.” It is undisputed that petitioners open Liberty Ridge to the public as a venue for wedding ceremonies and receptions and offer several wedding-related event services in connection therewith. Indeed, the only wedding-related service that Liberty Ridge does not provide is an officiant for the wedding ceremony. The couples who contract to wed at Liberty Ridge’s facilities are members of the general public who, like the McCarthys, may be attracted to the farm by its broadly disseminated advertisements and website. The fact that the wedding ceremonies occur on private property and pursuant to a written contract does not, as petitioners contend, remove Liberty Ridge’s facilities from the reach of the Human Rights Law; the critical factor is that the facilities are made available to the public at large. Thus, SDHR properly determined that petitioners were subject to the Human Rights Law.
Next, as to the merits, the court rejected petitioners’ reliance on their religions beliefs to justify their conduct:
As the record clearly reflects, Cynthia Gifford displayed no unwillingness to allow the McCarthys to marry at the farm until Melisa McCarthy referred to her fiancée as a “she.” Despite Cynthia Gifford’s clear rejection of the McCarthys as customers, petitioners nonetheless argue that, in advising Melisa McCarthy that “we do not hold same[-]sex marriages here at the farm,” they did not deny services to the McCarthys “because of” their sexual orientation (Executive Law § 296 [2] [a]). Instead, petitioners claim that the decision to do so was based solely upon the Giffords’ religious beliefs regarding same-sex marriage. Such attempts to distinguish between a protected status and conduct closely correlated with that status have been soundly rejected. The act of entering into a same-sex marriage is conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual orientation and, for purposes of the Human Rights Law, we hold that there is no basis for distinguishing between discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on someone’s conduct of publicly committing to a person of the same sex. Accordingly, petitioners discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation when they refused to host the McCarthys’ wedding on the premises.
Petitioners’ claim that their prohibition of same-sex wedding ceremonies on their property was narrowly drawn, and that they would “happily” host wedding receptions, parties or other events for couples in same-sex relationships, does not alter this conclusion. The Human Rights Law makes it unlawful to refuse, withhold from or deny, on the account of sexual orientation, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges furnished by a place of public accommodation. Simply put, the statute does not permit businesses to offer a limited menu of goods or services to customers on the basis of a status that fits within one of the protected categories. … Thus, petitioners’ purported willingness to offer some services to the McCarthys does not cure their refusal to provide a service that was offered to the general public.
The court also rejected petitioners’ reliance on the “Free Exercise” clauses of the federal and state constitutions, noting that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his [or her] religion prescribes (or proscribes).”