In Flanders v Goodfellow, No. 29, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 02261, 2025 WL 1127772 (N.Y., Apr. 17, 2025), the New York Court of Appeals overruled Bard v. Jahnke, 6 N.Y.3d 592, 815 N.Y.S.2d 16, 848 N.E.2d 463 (2006), and held that an owner of a domestic animal may, under certain circumstances, be held liable in negligence for harms caused by their animal.
Initially, as to plaintiff’s strict liability cause of action, the court explained:
Contrary to the determination of the courts below, we conclude that the record evidence creates a triable issue of fact as to whether the Goodfellows had constructive knowledge of their dog’s propensity to bite. In separate affidavits, the postal workers stated that anyone in the Goodfellows’ home would have been aware of the dog’s aggressive behavior, which included growling, snarling, barking, slamming into windows, and trying to bite at the postal workers through the glass. Although the Goodfellows contended that they did not know of the dog’s behavior and emphasized that the postal workers did not report the dog’s behavior to them or the post office, that response merely presents questions of credibility about the Goodfellows’ claimed ignorance of the dog’s behavior and the postal workers’ reasons for not reporting it. Moreover, the Goodfellows admitted that the dog got into a fight with another dog during its brief stint with its trainer, and Michelle testified that the dog had not previously interacted with strangers because they were not allowed in the house, without explaining whether concerns about the dog prompted that practice. Given all of this evidence, we conclude that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the Goodfellows should have known that the dog’s behavior “reflect[ed] a proclivity to act in a way that puts others at risk of harm” (Collier, 1 N.Y.3d at 447, 775 N.Y.S.2d 205, 807 N.E.2d 254). This question of fact precludes a grant of summary judgment for the Goodfellows on the strict liability cause of action and requires its reinstatement.
Turning to the negligence cause of action, the court held that Bard departed from the principles of tort law, including “incentiviz[ing] us to be mindful of the risk that our behavior might harm others by imposing a duty to act with due care.”
Accordingly, in a case involving harm caused by animals, an injured party may pursue one, or both, of the theories of (1) strict liability (by demonstrating that the owner knew or should have known the animal had vicious propensities), and (2) ordinary negligence (in which they seek to prove that the defendant failed to exercise due care under the circumstances that caused their injury).