In Declercq v. WWP Office LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 51552(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Sept. 24, 2013), the court awarded partial summary judgment to plaintiff on his claim that he was injured after falling from a ladder.
The court’s decision provides a good overview of the law under Labor Law § 240(1), and in particular the crucial distinction between “cleaning” and “routine maintenance.”
Specifically,
Plaintiff’s accident occurred during the cleaning of the last section [of walls and window ledges of the subway station to be cleaned]. Plaintiff testified that he was standing on an aluminum extension ladder hosing down the wall when the ladder kicked out from underneath him, causing him to fall approximately 20 feet to the floor and sustain injuries.
The court explained generally that:
Labor Law § 240(1) was designed to prevent those types of accidents in which the scaffold … or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person. … The Scaffold Law does not apply merely because work is performed at elevated heights, rather, it applies where the work itself involves risks related to differences in elevation.
Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his claim:
Plaintiff correctly argues that, since the ladder he was using while cleaning the subway station failed to remain stable and erect, and as no other adequate safety devices were provided to him by defendant, so as to protect him while subjected to an elevation-related risk, defendant is liable for his injuries under Labor Law § 240(1).
The collapse or malfunction of a safety device for no apparent reason creates a presumption in plaintiff’s favor that the device was insufficient to provide proper protection.
Where a ladder is offered as a work-site safety device, it must be sufficient to provide proper protection. It is well settled that [the] failure to properly secure a ladder, to ensure that it remain steady and erect while being used, constitutes a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).
The court rejected defendant’s claim Labor Law § 240(1) was not violated because plaintiff was involved in “routine cleaning.” It was “uncontested that plaintiff was cleaning a structure when he fell approximately 20 feet from the ladder”, that “such ladder was the only safety device provided to him” and that “plaintiff’s fall proximately caused his injuries.”
The court also noted that “cleaning” is specifically identified in the statute as an activity giving rise to liability. While defendant pointed to an inconsistency regarding the object being cleaned (i.e., either the interior walls or the interior window ledges) when plaintiff fell, that was immaterial, since both are “structures” under the statute.
The court also rejected defendant’s claim that plaintiff was engaged in “routine maintenance” because he was “cleaning interior walls with a regular hose” and not engaged in commercial cleaning:
As to the enumerated activity of cleaning, pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), the Court of Appeals has consistently found that routine maintenance consists of routine, household window washing. Contrary to defendant’s argument, whether plaintiff was engaged in an activity protected by Labor Law § 240(1) does not turn on whether plaintiff was cleaning windows. Neither the statute, nor the case law, has applied Labor Law § 240(1), as it relates to the enumerated activity of cleaning, only to the washing of windows. In fact, the Court of Appeals [has] found liability when a worker fell from a height while cleaning a railroad car. Thus, it is clear that the Court of Appeals never intended to narrow the scope of “cleaning” under Labor Law § 240(1) exclusively to cleaning windows. Further, the Court of Appeals has held that it is neither pragmatic nor consistent with the spirit of the statute to isolate the moment of injury and ignore the general context of the work. The intent of the statute was to protect workers employed in the enumerated acts.
The court therefore granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on defendant’s liability, and denied defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.