In Watson v. Jade Luxury Transp. Corp., the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to set aside the jury’s verdict of no liability and to direct a new trial on the issue of liability. This car accident case illustrates the relationship of the distinct elements of “negligence” and “proximate cause” in a personal injury lawsuit.
The facts:
This case arises from a two-car accident in the Bronx at the intersection of Inwood Avenue and Goble Place between a livery car driven by defendant Francisco Carrero, in which plaintiff was a rear-seat passenger, and a white Honda driven by defendant Derek Gonzalez. Gonzalez defaulted and has never testified, and plaintiff did not witness the accident. Carrero’s testimony constituted the sole evidence relating to the circumstances of the collision.
At his pretrial deposition, Carrero testified that he was driving north on Inwood Avenue, a one-way street. Gonzalez entered the intersection on Goble Place from the west, and faced a stop sign, giving Carrero the right of way into the intersection. Carrero stated that his view of the intersection and of Gonzalez’s car were unobstructed as he approached the intersection, and that he first saw the white Honda before he (Carrero) entered the intersection. At trial, however, Carrero repeatedly testified that his view of traffic entering the intersection from Goble Place on the west was obstructed by a truck parked on the south side of Goble Place and that he did not see the white Honda until after he had passed the truck. At that point, he testified that, although he tried, he was unable to avoid a collision. The jury was made aware of the inconsistencies between Carrero’s deposition and trial testimony through extensive impeachment with readings from his deposition.
The jury found no negligence on the part of Gonzalez. They also found that Carrero was negligent, but his negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the accident.
The court held that the jury’s findings were “irreconcilable” and that the trial court correctly set the verdict aside as inconsistent.
First, the court explained the interplay of the elements of negligence and causation:
[I]n the usual case, [t]he issue of whether a defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of an accident [injuries] is separate and distinct from the negligence determination. A defendant may act negligently without that negligence constituting a proximate cause of the accident [injuries]. Moreover, [w]here the verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view. However, in those cases where the issues of negligence and proximate cause are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause, the verdict must be set aside. (Emphasis added.)
Applying these principles, the court disagreed “that there is a rational basis for the jury’s finding that the negligence attributed to Carrero was not a proximate cause of the accident”:
Review of the evidence adduced at trial does not reveal a single plausible scenario by which Gonzalez could have been free from negligence and Carrero negligent, without such negligence being a substantial factor in causing the accident.
The fact that Gonzalez was not negligent practically eliminates the scenario to which Carrero testified at his deposition, namely, that Carrero had a clear view of the intersection and of the white Honda at all times, since it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how in such a scenario Carrero could have been negligent but not have caused the accident.
This leaves the scenario to which Carrero testified at trial, namely, that a truck blocked his view of the white Honda until Carrero was passing the truck, at which point it was impossible for him to avoid the collision. Since the jury found that Gonzalez was not negligent, Carrero’s negligence could have taken one or more of several forms, any or all of which would lead a rational jury to the inescapable conclusion that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Thus, the jury’s findings are irreconcilable, and Supreme Court providently set the verdict aside as inconsistent.
The dissent argued that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground that it was inconsistent, and faulted the majority for not addressing the jury charge.