In Newson v Vivaldi Real Estate Ltd., No. 2024-00261, 2982, 452625/22, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 00052, 2025 WL 36856 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept., Jan. 07, 2025), the Appellate Division, First Department addressed the following issue of first impression:
whether owners of housing accommodations can be held vicariously liable for the discriminatory conduct of their real estate brokers under the New York City Human Rights Law (City HRL)(see Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8–107[5][a]).
The court, upon analyzing the text, structure, and legislative history of the statute, concluded that the answer is “yes.”
From the decision:
We agree with amici curiae that absent vicarious liability, landlords would evade liability under the City HRL except when they directly interact with a prospective tenant. This is neither the mandate of the statute, nor supported by the legislative intent behind § 8–107 of the City HRL (see McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 95 [“courts in construing a statute should consider the mischief sought to be remedied by the new legislation, and they should construe the act in question so as to suppress the evil and advance the remedy”]).
The text of the City HRL also supports the imposition of vicarious liability upon landlords. Specifically, the key statutory remedy in the City HRL for housing discrimination is to approve the rental and to provide housing (see Administrative Code § 8–120[a][7]). Moreover, §§ 8–122 and 8–502 permit a tenant allegedly aggrieved by discriminatory practices to seek injunctive relief. In the absence of vicarious liability against owners, who have title to the prospective property, these remedies would be unavailable and rendered meaningless (Anonymous v. Molik, 32 NY3d 30, 37 [2018][a statute “must be construed as a whole and its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other” and that “a statutory construction which renders one part meaningless should be avoided”][internal quotations and citations omitted]; see also e.g. Matter of Suarez v Williams, 26 NY3d 440, 451 [2015][“(C)ourts should not interpret a statute in a manner that would render it meaningless”]).
Moreover, the New York City Commission on Human Rights disseminated guidance concerning its interpretation of the City HRL, stating that landlords “are responsible for the actions of anyone who plays a role in processing applications for [ ] rental units, even if that person is not [landlord’s] employee” (N.Y. City Commn on Human Rights, FAQ for Landlords: Best Practices for Housing Providers to Avoid Source of Income Discrimination [Mar 2023]). The Commission is entitled to “great deference” in its interpretations of the City HRL (see Matter of Arif v New York City Taxi & Limousine Commn., 3 AD3d 345, 346 [1st Dept 2004] [“(A)n administrative agency’s construction and interpretation of its own regulations and of the statute under which it functions are entitled to great deference”]).
The court rejected the Owners’ various arguments based on NYCHRL § 8–107(13)(a) and Doe v. Bloomberg L.P. , and concluded that “[n]othing in the language of the City HRL requires a conclusion that the City Council intended to abrogate common law principles of vicarious liability in housing discrimination claims.”
Having concluded, as a matter of law, that landlords can be held vicariously liable for their agents’ discriminatory conduct, the court applied it to the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, in which plaintiff alleges that “the agent acted on the Owners’ behalf and represented that the subject apartment was unavailable to plaintiff because of his use of HASA vouchers.”
Specifically, it held that the Supreme Court “correctly held that at this procedural posture, the complaint sufficiently pleaded facts alleging a cause of action for discrimination based on source of income under the City HRL § 8–107(5).”