In Zadok v. Lomner, No. 151526/2024, 2025 WL 675168 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Mar. 03, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s housing discrimination claim under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).
From the decision:
To plead a cause of action for housing discrimination, a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified to rent the housing accommodation; (3) he suffered an adverse outcome regarding the housing accommodation; and (4) the adverse outcome gave rise to an inference of discrimination (see Sayeh v 66 Madison Ave. Apt. Corp., 73 AD3d 459 [1st Dept 2010]). Plaintiff’s claim under the New York City Human Right’s Law, “must be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New York state civil and human rights laws … have been so construed” (Russell v New York Univ., 42 NY3d 377, 385 [2024]). Plaintiff alleges that he was evicted because defendants discovered that he was gay and that he was a secular Jew and not Orthodox (NYSCEF Doc No 1 ¶ 23).
Here, plaintiff alleges that he is a member of a protected class, that he rented an apartment from the defendants, and that the defendants removed him from the apartment (NYSCEF Doc No 1 ¶¶ 8, 12, 15-25). However, plaintiff fails to allege facts that the adverse outcome he suffered gives rise to an inference of discrimination. As for his religious identity, plaintiff fails to allege any facts that suggest defendants’ decision to evict plaintiff was because of his religion. As for his sexual identity, while plaintiff alleges that defendant, Jacob Lomner, shouted at him, “homosexual, I will kill you!”, following plaintiff returning to his apartment, “[s]tray remarks such as [this], even if made by a decision maker, do not, without more, constitute evidence of discrimination” (Godbolt v Verizon New York Inc., 115 AD3d 493, 494 [1st Dept 2014].
In determining whether a comment evidences an intent to discriminate or whether it is a non-probative “stray remark”, the following factors should be considered:2 (1) who made the remark, i.e., whether it was made by a decisionmaker or a separate party; (2) when the remark was made in relation to the adverse outcome; (3) the context of the remark, i.e., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as discriminatory; and (4) the context in which the remark was made, i.e. whether it was related to the decision making process (Schreiber v Worldco, LLC, 324 F Supp 2d 512 at 519 [SDNY 2004]). Here, while the alleged remark was made by the “decisionmaker” that is the landlord in this context, and the remark may be viewed as discriminatory by a reasonable juror, the context of the solitary remark was removed from the decision-making process.
“[E]ven [recognizing] the [NYCHRL]’s uniquely broad and remedial purposes [t]he [stray remark] doctrine is not inconsistent with the intentions of the law, since statements constitute evidence of discriminatory motivation when a plaintiff demonstrates that a nexus exists between the allegedly discriminatory statements and” the adverse outcome (id. at 494-95; see also Favourite v 55 Halley St., Inc., 381 F Supp 3d 266 [SDNY 2019] [comment by cooperative board member that super was “big, black and scary”, insufficient evidence of inference of housing discrimination against Black tenant]; see also Sherman v Town of Chester, 752 F3d 554 [2d Cir 2014] [developer’s allegations that citizens at a town board meeting expressed fear that town would become a “Hassidic Village”, and that a model home was vandalized with a spray painted swastika, insufficient to sustain discrimination claims]).
Based on this, the court concluded that plaintiff’s housing discrimination claim will be dismissed as plaintiff has failed to allege facts that gives rise to an inference of discrimination.