“Associational Discrimination” Race-Based Hostile Work Environment Claim Survives Dismissal Against Titan Motor Group

In Kekovic v. Titan Motor Group LLC, 22-CV-2142, 2023 WL 6385712 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race-based hostile work environment claims. Plaintiff, who identifies as a white male, is married to a black, African American man, and thus asserts “associational discrimination” claims based on this marriage.

As to plaintiff’s federal claims, the court explained:

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a hostile work environment claim under Title VII and section 1981.4 Plaintiff alleges that the actions taken against him were motivated by Valentino’s and Amendola’s race-based animus, and that they occurred over the approximately fifteen-month period following the October 8, 2020 incident. First, Plaintiff alleges that Valentino used the word “n*****r” during a work dinner with Plaintiff and Amendola, and after Plaintiff told him that he was married to a Black woman with whom he had two children, Valentino turned to Amendola and asked “how much is this going to cost me?” before going to the bathroom with Amendola for “approximately fifteen minutes,” where, Plaintiff alleges on information and belief, they further discussed the discriminatory remarks and Plaintiff’s reaction. (SAC ¶¶ 32–40.) Second, Plaintiff alleges that Amendola subsequently installed security cameras at the workplace, with one of the cameras focused exclusively on Plaintiff’s desk, and informed Plaintiff that he was being monitored in this fashion. (Id. ¶ 44.) In addition, Plaintiff “was the only employee of Defendants whose desk was exclusively monitored at all times by Amendola,” and “nearly half of the television screens depicting the security footage exclusively displayed [Plaintiff’s] desk.” (Id. ¶¶ 44–50.) Moreover, Amendola made sure to point out to Plaintiff that he was taking these actions, and stated that it was his “job to make [Plaintiff] feel uncomfortable,” that he knew what “real harassment” looked like, and that he knew “how to be a boss” for Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 48–49.) Third, Plaintiff alleges that Amendola “altered [Plaintiff’s] schedule so that he was required to work [outside normal business hours]” until 8:00 PM, — two hours after the business closed to the public — did not alter any other employee’s schedule, and did not require any other manager to work outside normal business hours. (Id. ¶¶ 52–55, 57.) He contends that Amendola made these adverse alterations to his schedule “so that it would be more difficult for [Plaintiff] to continue succeeding in his role with Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 53.)

*7 Finally, approximately fifteen months after the October 8, 2020 incident, having engaged in the various harassing conduct, Defendants terminated Plaintiff without providing a reason and despite Plaintiff having led them to “drastic growth in gross profit” and performing at or above Defendants’ expectations throughout his employment. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 28, 62.) While only Valentino’s use of the word “n****r” is overtly racially discriminatory, Defendants’ conduct subsequent to this incident is sufficiently harassing to constitute a hostile work environment. Considering Valentino’s racially discriminatory comment along with the “entire course of conduct,” Rasmy, 952 F.3d at 388, that Amendola and Valentino engaged in — constantly surveilling Plaintiff, forcing him to work outside of normal working hours making him the only employee subjected to this treatment — Plaintiff satisfies his de minimis burden. See Daniel, 689 F. App’x at *3 (vacating the district court’s dismissal of sex- and race-based hostile work environment claims because the district court “fail[ed] to include in its analysis some of the complained-of facially neutral incidents of harassment”; noting that plaintiff had alleged “approximately twenty discrete incidents of harassment during his 15-month employment” two of which the Court considered “severe” and one of which involved a supervisor’s use of the word n****r); Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 547–48 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Circumstantial evidence that facially [ ]neutral incidents were part of a pattern of discrimination on the basis of [a protected characteristic] may consist of evidence that the same individual engaged in multiple acts of harassment, some overtly [discriminatory] and some not.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff’s allegations rise to the level that “a reasonable employee would find the conditions of h[is] employment altered for the worse.” Terry, 336 F.3d at 148 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Cherry v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564 F. Supp. 3d 140, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (finding plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim survived summary judgment where his supervisor’s comments that he “[could not] do the job as well as a woman,” “did not belong [because he] was a man doing woman’s work,” and that “a woman could do [his] work faster and better” were considered together with her assigning him “a disproportionately heavy workload” and requiring him to work overtime while denying overtime compensation).

Based on this, the court held that plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Corporate Defendants are liable for creating a hostile work environment under Title VII and section 1981, “based on the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment and the fact that Amendola engaged in the harassing conduct and was Plaintiff’s supervisor.”

And, since plaintiff’s federal law claims survive dismissal, they necessarily survived dismissal under the comparatively lenient New York State and City Human Rights Laws.

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