In the disturbing case of Lent v. CCNH, Inc. d/b/a Cortland Care Center, 2015 WL 3463433 (NDNY June 1, 2015), the court held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged (hostile work environment) sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law.
Plaintiff alleged that her co-worker “cornered her on a daily basis in a locked closet on CCNH’s premises and forced her to touch his genitals, perform oral sex, and engage in sexual intercourse.” Defendant failed to respond, and therefore plaintiff sought a default judgment. (While the case is instructive on the procedural aspects of seeking a default judgment, here I’ll address the court’s analysis of plaintiff’s hostile work environment/sexual harassment claims.)
She asserted claims under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, New York Civil Rights Law 40-c, and New York common law.
A plaintiff asserting a hostile work environment claim must establish
(1) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer.
As to the first element, the court held:
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that her co-worker, Mr. Greene, harassed, sexually abused, and raped her over a nearly two-year period. The Court accepts these allegations from the Complaint and Exhibits as true for the purposes of this motion for default judgment. When Plaintiff informed her supervisor of Mr. Greene’s conduct, her supervisor stated that she did not believe the accusations, refused to transfer Plaintiff to another shift, and advised Plaintiff not to file a report with CCNH’s human resources department. Thereafter, Plaintiff’s supervisor informed Plaintiff that if she did not want to work on the same shift as Mr. Greene, she should quit her job. Notably, the EEOC determined after investigation that Plaintiff was subject to a hostile work environment. As a result, Plaintiff resigned her position at CCNH. Such actions go far beyond merely offensive conduct and are sufficient for a reasonable person to find her work environment abusive and hostile in violation of Title VII.
Plaintiff subjectively perceived her work environment to be hostile, as evidenced by her complaints about the unlawful behavior. Further, by complaining about her treatment in the workplace to her supervisor, Plaintiff made it sufficiently clear that Mr. Greene’s behavior was negatively affecting her work environment.
As to the second element, where (as here) “the alleged harasser is a co-worker, an employer will be liable if the plaintiff demonstrates that the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.”
Plaintiff met this standard:
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that her supervisor at CCNH was made aware of the harassment but did nothing about it. Although an employer may raise an affirmative defense if the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer, such a defense is unavailable when a tangible employment action is taken. This defense is unavailable in these circumstances because Plaintiff was constructively discharged after complaining about Mr. Greene’s conduct when her supervisor informed her to quit if she did not desire to work the same shift as Mr. Greene. Based on each of the foregoing factors, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated the elements of a valid claim for hostile work environment under Title VII.
The court also held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged retaliation and constructive discharge:
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she complained about Mr. Greene’s sexually abusive conduct to her supervisor, who informed her to quit if she did not want to continue working with Mr. Greene. As such, the Complaint adequately alleges constructive discharge. As noted above, the EEOC also found that Plaintiff had been constructively discharged. Finally, the Complaint also sufficiently alleges, both directly and indirectly, a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action. Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the elements for a valid claim of retaliation under Title VII.
However, the court dismissed as time-barred plaintiff’s claims under Civil Rights Law § 40–c and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Finally, the court – noting that “[w]hile a party’s default is deemed to constitute a concession of all well-pleaded allegations of liability, it is not considered an admission of damages” – held that plaintiff’s submissions were insufficient to establish damages, and explained that a hearing would be necessary on that issue.