In Europe v. Equinox Holdings, Inc. et al, 20-cv-7787 (JGK), 2022 WL 4124763 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2022), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s race-based hostile work environment claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
In this case, within the span of a few months, there were several incidents that were either racially charged on their face, or else were facially neutral but could be found by a reasonable jury to have been motivated by bias. For example, there is evidence that Maltman often made discriminatory comments in the plaintiff’s presence. These included objectifying comments about the bodies of Black women, including comments to McGeary about McGeary’s attire and, according to the plaintiff, the way McGeary’s body looked in that attire. Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶ 30. Maltman also suggested that McGeary must be related to another brown-skinned woman and that an Afro-Latino colleague should carry a client home on his back. Rodriguez Decl., ECF No. 89-2 ¶ 10; Europe Decl. ¶ 18. Maltman also referred to non-white staff as lazy and untrustworthy, and said that he wanted to get them fired. Id. ¶ 13. The plaintiff also reported to a People Services representative that the plaintiff had witnessed “countless inappropriate racial comments.” Orzick Decl., Ex. 16, ECF No. 89-16.
While the plaintiff was not the subject of these comments, her awareness of them nonetheless supports her claim that a hostile work environment existed. See Williams v. Consol. Edison Corp. of N.Y., 255 F. App’x 546, 549 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Because a hostile work environment claim focuses on the nature of the workplace environment as a whole, evidence of racial and sexual harassment and hostility beyond what is directed specifically at the plaintiff is relevant to our analysis.”); Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 69 (“[B]ecause the crucial inquiry focuses on the nature of the workplace environment as a whole, a plaintiff who herself experiences discriminatory harassment need not be the target of other instances of hostility in order for those incidents to support her claim.”); Bader v. Special Metals Corp., 985 F. Supp. 2d 291, 327 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Highly offensive, inherently misogynist terms and images may reasonably be interpreted to demean all women, and therefore may dramatically affect an employee’s working conditions even when not ‘directed’ at her.”). Moreover, the plaintiff’s supervisors were present when Maltman made some of these discriminatory comments, and when the plaintiff complained about Maltman’s behavior to Taveras, Taveras did not take any serious action in response. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting the failure of the plaintiff’s employer to take action in response to harassing conduct notwithstanding the plaintiff’s complaints).
There is also evidence that Equinox accommodated the racial preferences of a client. A reasonable jury could find that such pandering enshrined a system of racial division within the workplace and rendered that workplace substantially hostile for people of color. Finally, there is evidence that the plaintiff was the victim of disparate treatment based on sex and race because she was reprimanded for lateness more than Taveras.
The court concluded that “[c]onstruing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is a sufficient record from which a reasonable jury could find a hostile work environment” and therefore denied summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Title VII, § 1981, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL hostile work environment claims.