In Russell v New York University, No. 37, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 02226, 2024 WL 1773218 (N.Y. Apr. 25, 2024), the New York Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s claims for discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation were barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
From the decision:
In the federal litigation, the district court found that, because “no reasonable jury could find that NYU responded negligently here,” plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim failed, and that because plaintiff “failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could draw an inference of discrimination,” her discrimination claim failed (2017 WL 3059534, *31, 33). With respect to defendant’s retaliation claim, the district court held that plaintiff presented “no evidence that NYU’s stated reason for her termination was merely a pretext for discrimination,” no evidence “that her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination,” no “circumstances giving rise to an inference that she was terminated because of her sex, age, or religion,” and no “evidence of a causal connection between her termination and any protected activity” (id. at *32–35). Rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that the arbitrator’s finding that plaintiff’s misconduct did not “rise to the level that would justify immediate termination” supported an inference that her termination was retaliatory, the district court instead held that, because the arbitrator concluded that plaintiff committed serious misconduct requiring a serious response and “did not find that NYU’s termination of [plaintiff] was motivated by any discriminatory animus or anything else other than its judgment as to [plaintiff’s] misconduct,” the arbitrator’s conclusion “does not support an inference that [plaintiff] was terminated for discriminatory reasons” (id. at * 33). The district court also determined, with respect to NYU’s assertion that plaintiff’s termination was due to her harassing emails to a fellow professor and potential witness, that plaintiff failed “to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that NYU’s explanation was a pretext for impermissible retaliation” (id. *36). With respect to plaintiff’s “reli[ance] … on the alleged temporal proximity between the court-ordered mediation held in this lawsuit and her termination,” the court explained that, if considered, evidence of such temporal proximity would be insufficient to counter the finding that NYU’s explanation for plaintiff’s termination was not pretextual.
Where a federal court has made an “explicit finding that plaintiff produced no evidence on the relevant specific factual issue in the litigation,” as was done here, the application of the collateral estoppel bar to plaintiff’s identical claims under state statutes is warranted (Simmons–Grant, 116 AD3d at 140). With no factual findings to sustain a discrimination or retaliation claim no matter the standard, plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed.1 Application of the requisite liberal construction standard does not change the result, and this case does not implicate “the frequent risk that evidence winds up being undervalued for City HRL purposes because it has been filtered through a [federal] lens” (id.). Instead, applying the proper mixed-motive standard under the City HRL, Supreme Court correctly determined that plaintiff could not proceed on her claims where [t]he factual findings of the federal courts make clear that no pretext or retaliatory animus existed for the termination of plaintiff’s employment.
[Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]
Based on this, the court concluded that plaintiff’s claims against NYU were thus barred by collateral estoppel.