In Urban v. 35 East 19th Street Medicine, P.C., No. 151191/2024, 2024 WL 5248282 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Dec. 20, 2024), a gender/pregnancy discrimination case, the court granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.
From the decision:
New York public policy favors enforcement of contracts for arbitration (Cooper v Bruckner, 21 A.D.3d 758 [1st Dept 2005]). The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is the applicable body of law when a contract containing an arbitration clause “evidences a transaction involving commerce” (Gilbert v Indeed, Inc., 513 F Supp 3d 374, 400 [SDNY 2021]; 9 USC § 2). “Involving” commerce is broad, and indeed the functional equivalent of “affecting” interstate commerce (Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v Dobson, 513 US 265, 273-74 [1995]). Where the FAA is applicable, it preempts state and local law on the enforceability of an arbitration clause (Snazzi Reporting, Inc. v Veritext, 219 NYS3d 657, 657 [1st Dept 2024]). The FAA provides that “an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” (Gilbert at 400).
Here, the parties’ contract evidences a transaction involving commerce for purposes of the FAA. Plaintiff was employed by a business that provides treatment and engages in buying and selling goods and supplies across over 90 clinics nationwide. Further, the Agreement explicitly provides that the “Agreement shall be governed by the FAA” and the parties “acknowledge that the [Defendant’s] business and the nature of the employment affect interstate commerce” (NYSCEF Doc. 8). Therefore, because the FAA is applicable, CPLR provisions on the enforceability of arbitration agreements are preempted (Latif v Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, 2019 WL 2610985, *3, 2019 US DIST LEXIS 107020, *9 [SD NY 2019]; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v Conception, 563 US 333, 342 [2011]).
The Agreement was signed and executed by the parties. Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate all employment-related disputes (see NYSCEF Doc. 8), and Plaintiff electronically signed the agreement by clicking a checkbox (see Wu v Uber Tech, Inc., 219 Ad3d 1208, 1208 [1st Dept 2023] [where a valid arbitration agreement existed when a plaintiff electronically signed it by clicking a checkbox and button that confirmed that she reviewed and consented to the terms]; see also Patel v Macys Inc., 168 A.D.3d 632 [1st Dept 2019]).
Furthermore, the Agreement contains a clear and unmistakable waiver of the parties’ statutory right to a trial. Here, the parties agreed to “expressly waiv[e] any and all rights to a trial before a judge and/or a jury regarding any disputes and claims which [they] now have or which [they] may in the future have that are subject to arbitration under this agreement” (NYSCEF Doc. 8). The Agreement sets forth an exhaustive list of “claims covered by the agreement” which includes, inter alia, “claims for . . . discrimination” and “claims under any and all federal, state, or municipal statutes regulations, or ordinances, including but not limited to laws that prohibit discrimination, harassment, or retaliation in employment pursuant to any federal, state, or local fair employment or right to leave laws” (NYSCEF Doc. 8). There is no showing that the Agreement is unconscionable to the extent it requires arbitration of such claims (Newton v LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc., 192 AD3d 540, 541 [1st Dept 2021]).
Based on this, the court granted defendant’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA.
The court further, in the exercise of its discretion, denied defendant’s request for sanctions and attorneys’ fees and costs under 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1(a), nothing that “[s]anctions are to be reserved for purely frivolous conduct” and “[h]ere, the Plaintiff has raised non-frivolous arguments in opposition to Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.”