In Harge v. The City of New York, No. 150002/2023, 2025 WL 257189 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Jan. 18, 2025), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a claim of race-based discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law, and thus denied defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim.
From the decision:
Here, plaintiff alleges that he was treated “differently and worse than his Caucasian colleagues” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 188, 192, 197) by being assigned a marked patrol vehicle, making it more difficult to give out summonses (id. ¶¶ 142-143); by being denied training that other similarly situated Caucasian officers were offered (id. ¶ 92); by being denied his requests for sick leave (id. ¶ 151); by being restricted from a particular assignment of driving Detective Steven McDonald (id. ¶ 94); by being placed into the minor violations log (id. ¶ 61); by needlessly being referred for mental health assessment (id. ¶ 79) and by increased monitoring (id. ¶ 134). Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Morgan called him a “cancer” and a “boob” and ordered plaintiff’s supervisors to lower his evaluation score (id. ¶¶ 89, 110). Plaintiff also alleges that he was discriminated against by defendant Lipke when defendant Lipke hid his memo book (id. ¶ 104); and when plaintiff found a note indicating that plaintiff would not be granted lost time or emergency days without authorization from defendants Lipke or Sanford, which was not done for allegedly similarly situated Caucasian officers (id. ¶¶ 96, 104). Plaintiff claims that defendant Sanford was recorded using the “N” word and told plaintiff that he was “transferred off of his post because his ‘Gumba’ live down there-referring to the predominantly Black population he had been patrolling” (id. ¶¶ 117-118). Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Sanford said that defendant Lipke “was correct in being afraid of Harge because he is “ ‘a big Black guy’ ” ” (id. ¶ 116). Moreover, when plaintiff was injured during an altercation with a combative motorist, he was forced to drive the perpetrator to a precinct before being allowed to attend to his injuries – something that a similarly situated Caucasian officer would not be expected to do (id. ¶¶ 77-78).
As to the third prong, plaintiff has plead ways in which he was treated differently than his non-Black counterparts; such as when he was denied training and when he was not permitted to go to a hospital until after he transported a perpetrator to a precinct. The complaint sufficiently alleges discriminatory comments made by his superiors, thereby fulfilling the fourth element, requiring that plaintiff plead facts that give rise to an inference of discrimination. Assuming the truth of plaintiff’s allegations and giving him the benefit of every favorable inference – as the court must do on a motion to dismiss – this court finds that plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient for a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
The court further held that since “[t]he City Human Rights Law speaks to unequal treatment and does not distinguish between … harassment and hostile work environment … plaintiff’s allegations of hostile work environment also stand.”