In Cronemeyer v. The City of New York, No. 151551/2023, 2025 WL 574314 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Feb. 21, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of religious discrimination under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
From the decision:
The State and City Human Rights Laws proscribe employment discrimination” on the basis of religion (see Syeed v Bloomberg L.P., 41 NY3d 446, 451 [2024], citing Executive Law § 296[1][a]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8–107[1][a]).
To plead a cause of action for employment discrimination under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, Plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified to hold the position, (3) he suffered adverse employment action or was treated differently than other employees, and (4) that the adverse action or differential treatment occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (Harrington v City of New York, 157 AD3d 582, 584 [1st Dept 2018]; Herrington v Metro-N. Commuter R. Co., 118 AD3d 544, 544 [1st Dept 2014]). Plaintiff’s allegation that he was employed by the NYPD for fifteen (15) years without professional penalization or suspension is sufficient to plead that he had an employment relationship and that he was qualified to hold the position (NYSCEF Doc No. 1, verified complaint ¶¶ 1, 14, 16). Plaintiff has also sufficiently pled that he is a member of a protected class and that he was terminated from employment or suffered an adverse employment action (id. ¶¶ 20, 68; see Dall v St. Catherine of Siena Med. Ctr., 966 FSupp 2d 167, 177 [EDNY 2013] [Constructive discharge is considered an adverse employment action]).
*3 However, with respect to the final element, Plaintiff pleads only that “when he refused to get vaccinated, the NYPD constructively terminated his employment” (NYSCEF Doc No. 1, verified complaint ¶ 33), Plaintiff’s “constructive termination was unlawful retaliation for his refusing to compromise his religious principles” (id. ¶ 34), and that “Plaintiff’s unexpected constructive termination was nothing more than a pretext to deny Plaintiff his religious rights in Defendant’s Marxist and unethical organization” (id. ¶ 70).Plaintiff does not advance any facts regarding the period after the denial of his reasonable accommodation request and before the constructive termination to show that the termination was discriminatory or an act of retaliation, nor does he allege any remarks or actions by decisionmakers to show discriminatory intent (see Brown v City of New York, 188 AD3d 518, 519 [1st Dept 2020]; Whitfield-Ortiz v Dep’t of Educ. of City of New York, 116 AD3d 580, 581 [1st Dept 2014]). In short, there are no factual allegations that support a connection between his faith and his alleged constructive termination (see Askin v Dep’t of Educ. of City of New York, 110 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013][“Although plaintiff asserts that defendants’ actions were motivated by age-related bias, she does not make any concrete factual allegation in support of that claim, other than that she was 54 years old and was treated adversely under the State law”]).
Based on this, the court concluded that plaintiff “has not pled facts that show that his constructive discharge was motivated by his religion rather than his status as unvaccinated and Plaintiff’s legal conclusions are insufficient to state a cause of action under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL” and thus dismissed plaintiff’s first cause of action.