Singh v. Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC, 131 A.D.3d 1158, 1159-60, 16 N.Y.S.3d 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2015) illustrates the difference between the New York State Human Rights Law, on the one hand, and the broader New York City Human Rights Law, on the other.
Plaintiff, who identifies as Indian, worked for defendant as a security guard at JFK airport. Defendant fired plaintiff for sleeping on the job. Plaintiff argued that his supervisor “harassed, degraded, and subjected him to racially discriminatory comments throughout his employment” and that “at least in part because of racial discrimination, his supervisor reported him to the defendant’s higher level management for sleeping on the job.”
The court upheld the lower court’s dismissal under the NYS Human Rights Law:
Here, the defendant satisfied its burden on its motion for summary judgment by establishing a legitimate nonpretextual reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment. Specifically, it presented evidence that the plaintiff was found asleep while *1160 on duty, that sleeping while on duty is a violation of company rules, and that the plaintiff’s employment was terminated in accordance with a no-tolerance policy for such violations. The burden thus shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the reason given for the termination of his employment was true or was pretextual (see Nura v. International Shoppes, LLC, 130 A.D.3d 697, 11 N.Y.S.3d 867; Nettles v. LSG Sky Chefs, 94 A.D.3d at 728, 941 N.Y.S.2d 643). The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in this regard (see Cotterell v. State of New York, 129 A.D.3d 653, 655, 10 N.Y.S.3d 558; Apiado v. North Shore Univ. Hosp. [At Syosset], 66 A.D.3d 929, 930, 887 N.Y.S.2d 669). Indeed, the plaintiff admitted that he had been asleep while on duty. Moreover, he presented no evidence that his race or ethnicity “played a motivating or substantial role” in the defendant’s decision to terminate his employment ( **615 Michaelis v. State of New York, 258 A.D.2d 693, 694, 685 N.Y.S.2d 325; see Sandiford v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Educ., 22 N.Y.3d 914, 916, 977 N.Y.S.2d 699, 999 N.E.2d 1144). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly awarded summary judgment to the defendant dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of [the NYS Human Rights Law].
The court reached a different result with respect to plaintiff’s claims under the NYC Human Rights Law. Plaintiff’s argument:
The plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant liable for the discriminatory conduct of an “employee” (Administrative Code § 8–107[1][a] ), specifically, his tour supervisor (see Administrative Code § 8–107[13] [b] [1] ). The plaintiff alleges that the supervisor reported him to the defendant’s management at least in part because of racial or ethnic animus, that the supervisor did not report numerous non–Indian employees who had fallen asleep on duty, and that the supervisor’s motivation in this regard is actionable against the defendant under the New York City Human Rights Law.
Under the circumstances, defendant was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing this claim:
The evidence undisputedly established that the plaintiff’s employment was terminated by the defendant because the plaintiff was found to be asleep while on duty, in violation of its rules. Additionally, there was evidence that the defendant had a zero-tolerance policy with respect to violations of that rule. Further, it is also not disputed that the defendant’s no-tolerance policy regarding the termination of the employment of employees found sleeping while on duty is a legitimate policy. *1162 Nevertheless, the plaintiff presented evidence that his supervisor reported him to the defendant’s management in part out of racial animus, and did not report other, non–Indian employees who were found sleeping while on duty. Thus, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether his supervisor’s unlawful discrimination, which is to be imputed to the defendant, played a role in the termination of the plaintiff’s employment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of the New York City Human Rights Law.