In Marseille v. Mount Sinai Hospital, No. 21-2140, 2022 WL 14700981 (2d Cir. Oct. 26, 2022), the court, inter alia, affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s discrimination claims asserted under the New York City Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
Under the NYCHRL, it is unlawful for an employer, “because of the actual or perceived” age, race, national origin, or disability of any person, “[t]o discriminate against such person … in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a). NYCHRL discrimination claims are evaluated under a burden-shifting framework. To make an initial prima facie showing, a plaintiff need only show “differential treatment,” or that she was “treated less well,” because of a protected characteristic. Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant then has “the opportunity to offer legitimate reasons for its actions.” Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2015). If the defendant satisfies that burden, summary judgment is appropriate if no reasonable jury could conclude either that “the defendant’s reasons were pretextual” or that “the defendant’s stated reasons were not its sole basis for taking action, and that its conduct was based at least in part on discrimination.” Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, even if we were to assume that Marseille could establish a prima facie case for discrimination, summary judgment in Mount Sinai’s favor was appropriate. Mount Sinai has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for disciplining and terminating Marseille – concerns about the quality of her patient care and documentation practices – and, for the reasons explained in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Mount Sinai’s stated reasons were pretextual or that unlawful discrimination was also a motivating factor. On appeal, Marseille highlights evidence that O’Dea once called Marseille’s tone “aggressive” and suggests this comment alluded to a racial stereotype. The term “aggressive,” however, is a facially race-neutral term, and Marseille has “fail[ed] to offer evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the statement in context actually reflected the speaker’s use of th[is] language in a racially coded manner.” Cadet-Legros v. N.Y. Univ. Hosp. Ctr., 21 N.Y.S.3d 221, 228–29 (1st Dep’t 2015). For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s determination that Mount Sinai was entitled to summary judgment on Marseille’s discrimination claim.
The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for hostile work environment (based on its determination that plaintiff did not show a connection between the alleged incidents and a protected characteristic) and retaliation (based on its determination that the alleged protected activity, an email contending that it was inappropriate to contact plaintiff while she was on medical leave and referencing years of “intimidation” could not “reasonably be construed as an implicit complaint about unlawful conduct”).