In Silvers v Jamaica Hospital, No. 2021-00446, 620936/19, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 03938, 2023 WL 4751994 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., July 26, 2023), the court reversed a lower court determination dismissing plaintiff’s claims of sex discrimination asserted under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
The court summarized plaintiff’s discrimination claims as follows:
The amended complaint further alleged that the plaintiff was terminated from his employment for the stated reason that he was involved in an accident in a company vehicle, while several female EMTs who were involved in incidents of comparable severity were not discharged, and that his termination was the result of unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 290 et seq. [hereinafter NYSHRL]) and the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8–107 [hereinafter NYCHRL]).
This, the court held, was sufficient to meet plaintiff’s pleading burden:
A plaintiff alleging discrimination in employment in violation of the NYSHRL must establish that (1) she or he is a member of a protected class, (2) she or he was qualified to hold the position, (3) she or he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination” (Ayers v. Bloomberg, L.P., 203 A.D.3d 872, 874, 165 N.Y.S.3d 554; see Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 305, 786 N.Y.S.2d 382, 819 N.E.2d 998). “Under the NYCHRL, the plaintiff must establish that she or he was subject to an unfavorable employment change or treated less well than other employees on the basis of a protected characteristic” (Ayers v. Bloomberg, L.P., 203 A.D.3d at 874, 165 N.Y.S.3d 554; see Golston–Green v. City of New York, 184 A.D.3d 24, 38, 123 N.Y.S.3d 656). Here, accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint sufficiently alleges circumstances which give rise to an inference of sex discrimination, and adequately states a cause of action pursuant to the NYCHRL and the NYSHRL (see Oluwo v. Sutton, 206 A.D.3d 750, 752, 170 N.Y.S.3d 177; Mirro v. City of New York, 159 A.D.3d 964, 966, 74 N.Y.S.3d 356; Kassapian v. City of New York, 155 A.D.3d 851, 65 N.Y.S.3d 562).
The court concluded that plaintiff’s amended complaint was “sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause [of] action.”