Court Denies Chipotle’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Claim; Dispute Arose After “Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021”

In Famuyide v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. et al, 2023 WL 5651915, (D.Minn. August 31, 2023), the court, applying the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

That statute provides, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, or the named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging such conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.

A statutory note clarifies the EFAA is applicable with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after March 3, 2022.”

Here, the parties disagreed on the meanings of the undefined terms “dispute” and “arise” (i.e., when plaintiff’s “dispute” “arose”).

Plaintiff argued that the parties’ dispute arose when plaintiff filed her complaint against Chipotle in state court (after March 3, 2022); defendant argued that the parties’ dispute arose on the date of the injury, i.e., the date of the alleged harassment/assault (before March 3, 2022).

The court – citing the ordinary meanings (dictionary definitions) of the disputed terms, the statutory text,, and case law – concluded that the parties’ dispute arose (for purposes of the EFAA) when plaintiff filed her complaint against Chipotle in state court.

It explained, inter alia:

The definitions within the EFAA also make clear that a dispute requires more than an injury. The EFAA defines a “sexual assault dispute” as “a dispute involving a nonconsensual act or sexual conduct,” and it defines “sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment.” 9 U.S.C. § 401 (emphasis added). If the underlying conduct alone—the sexual assault or harassment—automatically gave rise to a dispute, then the legislature’s use of the word “dispute” within these two definitions would be superfluous. A “sexual assault dispute” would merely mean “a nonconsensual act or sexual conduct.” And a “sexual harassment dispute” would mean “conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment.” This cannot be so. “[A] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”

Accordingly, it held that the EFAA applied, rendering the arbitration agreement unenforceable, and denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

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