In Santana v. Yonkers City School District et al, No. 60352/2021, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 23386, 2023 WL 8590590 (Sup Ct, Dec. 07, 2023), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of race discrimination asserted under the New York State Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
As to plaintiff’s first cause of action for discrimination under Executive Law § 296(1), Yonkers City School District contends that plaintiff cannot establish an inference of discrimination, arguing plaintiff’s claims are speculative and unsupported by admissible evidence (Memorandum of Law in Support, p. 23). Contrary to this contention, plaintiff’s testimony provides factual specificity as to his complaint of discrimination and the alleged adverse employment action. Plaintiff testified that following his complaint of discrimination, the principal went into his classroom almost ten times to intimidate him and make him feel that he was being watched. He testified it was unheard of for a principal to go into a teacher’s classroom almost ten times (Defendants’ Exhibit D, p. 115-116, 118). Plaintiff testified that the principal and assistant principal made appointments with parents on his behalf without letting him know, which did not happen to his white colleagues (Id. at 122-123). Plaintiff testified that students were transferred out of his class without letting him know, and the assistant principal was entertaining complaints from students without giving him an opportunity to be present, neither of which happened to white teachers (Id. at 125-126). Plaintiff’s testimony raises a triable issue of fact as to whether he can establish an inference of discrimination.
Yonkers City School District argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he was not discharged. Plaintiff resigned before a hearing, before the board acted on the superintendent’s recommendation, and before the effective termination date (Memorandum of Law in Support, p. 22-23). Plaintiff argues he was effectively discharged. He argues that if he waited for the meeting and a determination by the board of education in September 2020, it would have significantly limited him in obtaining employment in his field elsewhere prior to the start of the next school year (Defendants’ Exhibit A, p. 12).
An employee is constructively discharged when an employer, instead of directly discharging the employee, deliberately creates working conditions “so intolerable that a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would have felt compelled to resign” (Golston-Green v City of New York, 184 AD3d 24, 44 [2d Dept 2020]; see also Bond v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 215 AD3d 469 [1st Dept 2023]). The analysis requires consideration of the cumulative effect of defendant’s conduct and a determination as to whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, the defendant created working conditions so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign (Lambert v Macy’s E., Inc., 34 Misc 3d 1228[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52434[U] (Sup Ct, Kings County 2010). Here, plaintiff’s testimony indicates that following his complaint of discrimination, he was allegedly subjected to increased scrutiny and harassment, which his white colleagues did not experience. Dr. Quezada’s July 1, 2020 letter notified plaintiff that Dr. Quezada would recommend plaintiff be terminated and indicated the board of education would act on this recommendation after the start of the next school year (Defendants’ Exhibit I). Plaintiff’s testimony together with Dr. Quezada’s letter raise a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was constructively discharged.
The court likewise denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim, noting that “following his complaint of discrimination, he was allegedly subjected to increased scrutiny and harassment.”