In Beauchine v. City of Syracuse, New York et al, 5:21-cv-00845 (BKS/TWD), 2024 WL 2700874 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New York State Human Rights Law.
In analyzing this claim, the court applied the three-step burden-shifting standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
After finding that plaintiff presented a prima facie case of discrimination, and that defendants articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting plaintiff, the court turned to the issue of pretext:
Here, Plaintiff presents evidence that C.R. and K.A., both of whom were lower on the list than Plaintiff, with scores of 81.5 and 79, respectively, (Dkt. No. 84-14, at 5), lacked recent Patrol experience, but were nonetheless promoted to sergeant, (Dkt. No. 87, at 27 (arguing that male officers “were promoted and not required to ‘prove’ themselves” through recent Patrol duty). Plaintiff also asserts that Mark Rusin and Mark Werbeck were not “required to transfer to patrol or the road before or after their promotion” under Chief Buckner from police officer to sergeant. (Dkt. No. 85, ¶ 21). Deputy Chief Cecile explains that Rusin and Werbeck were “promoted in November 2019—before Plaintiff was reachable” for promotion—and worked in non-Patrol divisions (Compliance Unit and Information Technology and Records) “where there was a need for Sergeants to serve in a supervisor role.” (Dkt. No. 93-1, ¶ 9). Deputy Chief Cecile further states that during the relevant promotional cycles, there was “a significant need for supervisors on Patrol” and “all newly promoted Sergeants in late 2020 and 2021 were assigned to Patrol regardless of their previous assignment.” (Id. ¶ 11). It is undisputed that K.A. was not in Patrol prior to promotion. (See Dkt. No. 84-42, at 2 (memo dated December 20, 2016, regarding K.A.’s permanent transfer from Patrol to the Administration Bureau, Technology & Program Management Division)). However, Deputy Chief Shoff states that Defendants “did not have the same concerns about [K.A.’s] ability to work patrol because he did not have the same history of difficulties on patrol as we understood Plaintiff did” and because he worked eleven “summer deployment shifts in 2019 … as opposed to Plaintiff’s three shifts.” (Dkt. No. 77-35, ¶ 33). But Defendants do not address the evidence that when Plaintiff returned from maternity leave in July 2017, after having obtained treatment for PTSD and having been medically cleared to return, she was again assigned to work Patrol, where she worked without incident until April 2, 2018, when she transferred to Records. (Dkt. No. 84-2, at 133; Dkt. No. 77-5, at 34). Chief Buckner testified that his concerns about Plaintiff’s ability to supervise on Patrol stemmed from their December 2018 conversation during which she recounted her history of PTSD and expressed her concerns “about going back to the streets,” (Dkt. No. 77-8, at 2), but Plaintiff testified that she “never once said to [Chief Buckner] that [she] was scared [or did not want] to go back to the road.” Thus, there is a factual question as to whether Plaintiff’s lack of recent Patrol experience and PTSD were legitimate reasons for failing to promote Plaintiff or a pretext for unlawful gender discrimination. The Court therefore concludes that as Plaintiff has presented evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that Defendants’ stated reason for denying promotion, lack of recent, i.e., post-PTSD diagnosis, Patrol experience, was false or inadequate and that, given that eight male officers with lower civil scores were promoted over her, see Goonewardena v. New York Workers Comp. Bd., 258 F. Supp. 3d 326, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Evidence that an employee was replaced by an individual outside his protected group—particularly if that individual is less qualified—may be probative of pretext.” (citing Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006), aff’d, 788 F. App’x 779 (2d Cir. 2019), gender-related discrimination was the true reason.
The court concluded that “[a]lthough there is no direct evidence of gender-related animus and Plaintiff’s evidence of gender-related discrimination is relatively weak when viewed in light of the evidence that there were only two females in the field of eligible candidates and that Defendants in fact promoted the other female officer, who also had a lower civil service score than Plaintiff, given the material issues of fact, and drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.”