In McCabe v 511 West 232nd Owners Corp., No. 91, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 06290, 2024 WL 5126078 (N.Y., Dec. 17, 2024), the New York Court of Appeals held, as a matter of first impression, that a co-op board’s refusal to transfer a building unit to a shareholder’s partner because they were not married did not constitute housing discrimination because of the partner’s marital status within the meaning of the New York City Human Rights Law.
In sum, petitioner and shareholder resided together in a cooperative apartment in Manhattan. The shareholder died and bequeathed the apartment to the petitioner. The board served petitioner with notice to cure and vacate the unit on the ground that the shareholder of record was deceased and petitioner was occupying the apartment without the cooperative’s consent. Ultimately, the petitioner brought a CPLR 78 proceeding challenging the board’s refusal to transfer the lease and shares as violative of, e.g., the NYCHRL’s prohibition on marital status discrimination.
The Court of Appeals ultimately held that the board’s actions did not constitute discrimination based on “marital status” within the meaning of the New York City Human Rights Law:
We begin with the text and structure of the statute. The NYCHRL makes it an unlawful practice, among other things, “to discriminate against any [ ] person or persons in the terms, conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or lease of any such housing accommodation or an interest therein” “because of the actual or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, gender, age, disability, sexual orientation, uniformed service, height, weight, marital status, partnership status, or immigration or citizenship status of any person or group of persons ….” (Administrative Code § 8–107[5][a][1]).
Petitioner’s argument hinges on the definition of the term “marital status” as used in this provision. She argues that the prohibition on discrimination based on marital status requires the board to accord her the same rights under the lease as if she were Burrows’ “spouse” because she is the “equivalent of a spouse.” In this regard, petitioner’s claim is different from a marital status discrimination claim brought by someone denied access to housing (or, as set forth in other provisions of the NYCHRL, employment) because the individual is single, married, divorced, or widowed (see e.g. Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d 506, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 415 N.E.2d 950). Petitioner instead argues that the board’s refusal to treat her as Burrows’ spouse because she was not married to him constitutes marital status discrimination.
he NYCHRL does not define “marital status,” but Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “[t]he condition of being single, married, legally separated, divorced, or widowed” (Black’s Law Dictionary [12th ed 2024], marital status). Along the same lines is the general understanding: “when one is queried about one’s ‘marital status,’ the usual and complete answer would be expected to be a choice among ‘married,’ ‘single,’ etc.” (Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 511–512, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 415 N.E.2d 950). A plain reading of the term, then, is that marital status reflects the legal condition of being single, married, legally separated, divorced, or widowed. Marital status turns on whether an individual has “participated or failed to participate in a marriage,” and is distinct from “the identity or situation of the individual’s spouse” (id.).
This reading comports with how the term was initially understood. Marital status was added to the list of protected classifications in 1973 (see Local Law No. 7 [1973] of City of New York § 3). In a statement before the City Council, the New York Attorney General explained that the provision was included to address the problem that “many single persons in New York City have been refused housing accommodations merely because of their status as single persons …. Landlords have a right to insist that applicants for apartments have the necessary financial means to afford their apartments. But such decision should be based on individual consideration of each applicant’s background, rather than on stereotyped characterizations based on an applicant’s sex or marital status” (Statement of N.Y. State Attorney General before the New York City Council, Oct. 3, 1972, Local Law Bill Jacket, Local Law No. 7 [1973] of City of N.Y. at 35–36). Those remarks indicate that “marital status” refers to whether a person is participating in a marriage, not the nature of one’s relationship with another specific person.
Three other provisions of the NYCHRL reinforce this understanding. First, the 2005 amendments added “partnership status” to the list of classes protected from discrimination under the NYCHRL (Local Law No. 85 [2005] of City of New York §§ 2–3). Partnership status is defined as “the status of being in a domestic partnership, as defined by subdivision a of section 3–240” (Administrative Code of City of New York § 8–102). Section 3–240 of the Code, in turn, defines “domestic partners” as “persons who have a registered domestic partnership,” including “persons who are members of a marriage that is not recognized by the state of New York, domestic partnership, or civil union, lawfully entered into in another jurisdiction” (Administrative Code of City of New York § 3–240).
The Court continued by noting, inter alia, the NYCHRL’s “domestic partnership” amendment “suggests that the City Council did not understand the bar on ‘marital status’ discrimination to cover unmarried couples at the time it passed that amendment” since “[i]f it did, then presumably a couple who had registered as domestic partners would already be covered, as would an unmarried couple who had not registered as domestic partners, and there would have been no need for the amendment.”