In Balchan v. New York City Housing Authority, 21-cv-10326 (JGK), 2025 WL 588021 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
This decision illustrates the application of the principle that a “failure to accommodation” claim is not viable where the proposed accommodation would eliminate an “essential function” of the plaintiff’s job.
From the decision:
The key issue on this motion is whether the plaintiff has established the third element of a prima facie claim for failure to accommodate: that the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of his job with a reasonable accommodation.4 Resolving this issue requires determining what the essential functions of the plaintiff’s job are. The defendants argue that in-person field inspections are an essential function of the plaintiff’s position, and that the plaintiff cannot perform that function with the requested accommodation—working remotely full-time. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that his position is a supervisory one that does not require him to perform fieldwork.
The ADA does not define “essential functions,” but EEOC regulations define the term as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). “Although a court will give considerable deference to an employer’s determination as to what functions are essential, there are a number of relevant factors that may influence a court’s ultimate conclusion as to a position’s essential functions.” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 126. Relevant factors to consider include “the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, the mention of the function in a collective bargaining agreement, the work experience of past employees in the position, and the work experience of current employees in similar positions.” See id. (citing Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997)). “[T]he question whether a task constitutes an essential function depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga, 369 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 2004).
*7 There is no genuine dispute that fieldwork is an essential function of the plaintiff’s job and that granting the accommodation requested by the plaintiff—the ability to work remotely full-time—would eliminate that essential function.
Undisputed evidence in the record establishes that fieldwork is an essential function of the LOT Specialist position. The LOT Specialist job description states, as the very first responsibility listed for the position, that the LOT Specialist will “[c]onduct field oversight of NYCHA personnel and vendors conducting” certain lead-based paint activities. See Defs. Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 30 (emphasis added); Ex. 1 to Le Decl. The plaintiff disputes the exact proportion of time that he spent in the field before the COVID-19 pandemic, but he does not dispute the fact that he worked in the field pre-pandemic. Indeed, the plaintiff testified at his deposition that, between September 2019 and March 2020, he spent a significant amount of time in the field. See Ex. 16 to Le Decl. at 66, ECF No. 47-16 (testifying that, for the month of September 2019, the plaintiff was in the field every day except for four days); id. at 112 (admitting that he was doing oversight in the field before March 2020). Also, O’Hagan, who was tasked with building the EHS Department and who hired the plaintiff in 2019, testified that the “first responsibility” of the LOT Specialist position was to “provide field oversight,” and that his “intention was that this was a field-based position.” Ex. 6 to Le Decl. at 31, ECF No. 47-6. The plaintiff’s supervisors, Eweka and Blagrove, likewise testified that one of the plaintiff’s core responsibilities was to conduct inspections in the field. See Ex. 4 to Le Decl. at 66–67 (“Eweka Dep.”), ECF No. 47-4 (“Romel was, when he was hired, his job was in the field. He was there to conduct field inspections, not clerical work in the office.”); Ex. 17 to Le Decl. at 49 (“Blagrove Dep.”), ECF No. 47-17 (“[T]his was primarily a field position because of the nature of the work. To do the oversight, it requires going out into the field and actually doing direct observation of NYCHA employees and vendors performing lead-based paint reduction activities.”).
The plaintiff essentially argues that NYCHA should have removed all field-based functions from his job and given him exclusively office-based, administrative assignments that he could complete remotely. But this would require eliminating an essential function—conducting field inspections—from the plaintiff’s job.
Continuing, the court explained that “[a]lthough a reasonable accommodation may include adjustments to work schedules or other job restructuring, … a reasonable accommodation can never involve the elimination of an essential function of a job.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]
The court additionally rejected plaintiff’s contention that NYCHA should have created a new, light-duty position for him, since “the ADA does not require creating a new position for a disabled employee.”