In Dorilus v. DCAS, No. 101225/2023, 2025 WL 1238058 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Apr. 24, 2025), the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of religious discrimination under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
From the decision:
In DCAS’s supporting papers, it assumes that this cause of action is based upon a violation of the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws, specifically provisions that apply in the employment context.3 Plaintiff does not dispute this or suggest otherwise. However, DCAS is not his employer; rather, it appears that the NYPD is. Nonetheless, even ignoring that the cause of action is not pled with enough specificity to identify the precise nature of the claim, plaintiff has not adequately alleged a religious accommodation claim.
While ordinarily courts do not question whether a request for a religious accommodation is based on a sincerely held belief (see Kane v de Blasio, 575 F. Sup. 3d 535, 442 [SDNY 2021]), here, plaintiff has not so much as identified the religious belief underlying his request. For example, in support of his motion, he attaches the emails to DCAS requesting the accommodation, including a photo of the wedding invite. But the emails do not indicate that his presence served a religious function at the wedding or what religious beliefs compelled his attendance. His affidavit is more specific, averring that he made the request because he was the best man at the wedding. However, again, no religious conviction is implicated. Thus, even granting him the benefit of every possible inference as required on this motion, plaintiff has merely pled that he requested the accommodation based upon a personal preference to take the test on a different day. (See Campbell v City of New York, 227 AD3d 538, 538 [1st Dept 2024].)
This conclusion–that he requested an accommodation based upon preference as opposed to conviction–is only furthered by plaintiff’s admission that the test and the wedding were held on separate days and did not conflict with each other. As plaintiff explained in his New York General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing, he could not attend both because he would “not even be able to enjoy the festivities at the wedding, because obviously a wedding is not going to end at 7:30, for me to make it back home, get a good night’s rest, wake up at four o’clock in the morning, drive two and a half hours to go sit and take the exam.” (NYSCEF doc. no. 18 at 32, 50-h hearing transcript; see also NYSCEF doc. no. 23, affidavit in support of MS 002 [If his request were approved, “[I] could have attended the wedding and its festivities and not [have had] to take the exam where I had to be up at 4 am to driver over 2 ½ hours and get in line to wait and take a 4-5 hour exam.”]).
The court concluded, based on this, that “since plaintiff has not identified a religious belief, either when making his original accommodation request to DCAS or herein, he has not adequately plead a cause of action for religious discrimination.”