In Smith v. The City of New York, No. 153568/2024, 2025 WL 1446812 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County May 20, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of race and arrest-history discrimination.
From the decision:
Under both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, a complaint need only “give fair notice of the nature of the claim and its grounds,” and must be “construed broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs” (Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 22 NY3d 881, 884-85 [2013]; Perez v. Y & M Transp. Corp., 219 AD3d 1449,1451 [2d Dept 2023]). Under the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must allege (1) membership in a protected class, (2) qualification for the position, (3) an adverse employment action, and (4) circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent (Stephenson v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union Local 100, 6 NY3d 265, 270 [2006]). After the 2019 amendments, the NYSHRL is to be interpreted no less liberally than the NYCHRL (Executive Law § 300). And, as the Second Circuit has confirmed, a plaintiff may raise that inference simply by pleading that she was “treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside [her] protected group” (Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 [2d Cir. 2013]).
Here, the amended complaint more than meets that standard. Plaintiff alleges that he is African-American, a protected characteristic under both statutes; that he was a fully tenured, highly regarded NYPD Sergeant with no prior disciplinary record; and that he was abruptly terminated following a disciplinary trial. Critically, he identifies at least five non-Black officers–charged under analogous circumstances, including domestic-violence allegations–who either prevailed at their disciplinary hearings or received markedly lighter penalties (e.g., mere suspensions) despite similar factual predicates. Those comparator allegations, taken as true, establish a “reasonably close resemblance of facts and circumstances,” and thus adequately plead an inference of race discrimination (Mihalik, 715F.3d at 110, supra; Etienne v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 223 AD3d 612 [1st Dept 2024]).
Defendant’s attempt to proscribe these well-pleaded allegations through out-of-context disciplinary transcripts and affidavits improperly seeks to convert this motion into one for summary judgment. Documentary evidence may defeat a complaint only when it is “unambiguous, authentic, and undeniable” such that it “definitely dispose[s] of the plaintiff’s claim” (Art & Fashion Group Corp., 120 AD3d at 438, supra). Here, far from “undeniably” negating any inference of bias, the pleadings and statistical allegations of systemic disparity–echoed in Ashanti v. City of New York, 225 AD3d 443 (1st Dept 2024)–readily support the conclusion that discovery is warranted. Accordingly, the court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs race-discrimination claims under either the NYSHRL or the NYCHRL.
With respect to arrest-history discrimination, Plaintiff claims that the City improperly relied upon sealed arrest records in making disciplinary decisions and that such reliance had a disparate impact on him as a Black man, compounding existing racial biases.
While the NYCHRL provides broad protections against discrimination based on arrest records, it expressly exempts police officers from the ambit of those protections under § 8-107(10)(f). Accordingly, Plaintiffs NYCHRL-based claim must be dismissed with prejudice.However, Plaintiffs arrest history allegations remain viable under the NYSHRL. As this court held in Holloway v. City of New York (Index No. 155255/2022, NY Sup Ct, NY County, Jan. 12, 2024), the exemption under the NYCHRL does not preclude claims under the NYSHRL or federal law where the plaintiff asserts that sealed arrest records were improperly used to impose adverse employment actions. In Holloway, the court emphasized that “where a police officer alleges that the improper consideration of sealed arrest records contributed to a discriminatory employment decision, and that this disparate treatment was connected to a protected class such as race, such claims are independently cognizable under the NYSHRL.” Indeed, the statutory protections concerning sealed records are rooted in the strong public policy against the collateral use of non-adjudicated arrests.
Further, the NYSHRL must be construed liberally in favor of plaintiffs (see Executive Law § 300). A claim that the City relied on sealed arrest records in a manner that disparately impacted Black officers, even if incidentally, falls squarely within the ambit of the NYSHRL’s protections. The Legislature’s decision not to incorporate a carve-out akin to that found in the NYCHRL supports the conclusion that the NYSHRL was meant to encompass all public employees, including law enforcement personnel, in its protections against discriminatory arrest record usage.
Accordingly, while Plaintiff’s arrest history claim under the NYCHRL is barred by statute and dismissed with prejudice, the NYSHRL claim survives. To the extent the City argues otherwise, such contentions are premature and better resolved on a full record.
The court declines to dismiss that portion of Plaintiff’s arrest history discrimination claim sounding under the NYSHRL.
The court further dismissed plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages (as such damages may not be recovered against a municipal entity).