In Winfrey v. The City of New York, No. 160719/2024, 2025 WL 1446806 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County May 20, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of race discrimination under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
From the decision:
To plead a prima facie case of discrimination under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, Plaintiff must allege that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for her position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discriminatory animus (Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 AD3d 665, 667 [1st Dept 2019]).
While employment discrimination claims under the NYCHRL are afforded a liberal construction (Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 92 AD3d 29, 35-36 [1st Dept 2011]), even under this generous standard, Plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that discrimination played at least some role in the adverse action.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she is a Black woman, and that she was terminated despite a negative breathalyzer test. However, the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations connecting her termination to her race or gender. Instead, the complaint makes clear that the disciplinary action was based on allegations of alcohol consumption on duty–an allegation that was substantiated following an OATH hearing.
To be sure, although Judge Casey’s OATH Report and Recommendation meticulously found that Officer Winfrey exhibited signs of impairment–“wobbly gait” and “glassy eyes,” followed by inconsistent testimony during the MEO-16 interview–and the DOC Commissioner ultimately exercised discretion to terminate her employment, Plaintiffs complaint is conspicuously devoid of any nexus between these findings and her status as a Black woman.
Under well-settled Appellate Division, First Department, precedent, a plaintiff must plead more than mere membership in a protected class; she must identify specific facts suggesting that race or gender served as a motivating factor in the adverse decision (see Harrington v. City of New York, 157 AD3d 582, 584 [1st Dept 2018]). Here, Plaintiff identifies herself as Black and female, alleges her termination followed a disciplinary process, and protests the fairness of that process-but nowhere does she allege that similarly situated non-Black or male officers escaped comparable discipline, that decision makers made disparaging remarks about her race or gender, or that procedural anomalies were targeted specifically at her protected traits. Indeed, the undisputed documentary record–specifically, the Charges and Specifications (Ex. C) and the breathalyzer evidence (Ex. B)–reflects a neutral application of DOC’s standards across all officers implicated in the June 14,2019 incident. Likewise, the record reflects that the DOC pursued disciplinary charges against multiple officers implicated in the same incident, further undermining any inference of discriminatory animus.
The court concluded that “[a]bsent factual allegations that substantially undermine the neutrality of the disciplinary findings, Plaintiff cannot bridge the gap from ‘I am Black and I was fired’ to ‘I was fired because I am Black,’ and her discrimination claims accordingly fail as a matter of law.”