In Wong v. Eason, No. 952133/2023, 2026 WL 909713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 30, 2026), the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss her discrimination claims (but not her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
From the decision:
Plaintiff Winnie Wong, desirous of a career as a publicist in the music industry, began her career as a receptionist at A&M Records (“A&M”) office in New York City in June of 1991 following her college graduation. Defendant Donald Eason, Vice President and/or Senior Vice President of A&M, flew in from the Los Angeles office on a weekday in or about early-to-mid Fall of 1991 to visit the A&M office at 595 Madison Avenue. While in New York, Eason stayed at the Parker Meridien Hotel.
It was at the New York office that Eason introduced himself to plaintiff as an executive at A&M. In plain sight, during normal working hours in the public reception area, and in full view of A&M agents, executives, supervisors, and other employees, Eason “attempted to groom [p]laintiff” by complimenting her and showing interest in her career and professional ambitions. He offered to give plaintiff advice to help her with her music career and believed he knew of job opportunities that she would be a good fit for. He then invited her to the Parker Meridien to further discuss.
When plaintiff arrived at the hotel lobby, Eason told her he was on a phone call meeting and told her to come upstairs to his room. Plaintiff was instructed to wait on the couch while Eason finished his call. When the call ended, he joined her on the couch. Shortly thereafter, “suddenly and without warning” and despite her protestations and verbalized lack of consent, Eason pulled plaintiff up to the standing position, pushed her onto the bed, climbed on top of her, and sexually assaulted her.
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is afforded a liberal construction and the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, accord the pleading the benefit of every reasonable inference, and only determine whether the facts, as alleged, fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]). “Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss” (Cortland St. Recovery Corp. v Bonderman, 31 NY3d 30, 38 [2018] [citation omitted]). “[U]nlike on a motion for summary judgment where the court searches the record and assesses the sufficiency of the parties’ evidence, on a motion to dismiss the court merely examines the adequacy of the pleadings” (id.).
Upon a review of the pleadings, this Court finds that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to withstand dismissal of the action at this stage in the litigation. Nevertheless, the IIED claim against Eason should be dismissed as duplicative since other traditional tort claims are available (see Fleischer v NYP Holdings, Inc., 104 AD3d 536, 539 [1st Dept 2013]; McIntyre v Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 256 AD2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1998] (dismissing IIED claim as duplicative of claim for sexual harassment because it is a nontraditional remedy and “is a theory of recovery that is to be invoked only as a last resort”).
The court noted, however, that while these claims survived pre-motions to dismiss, it remains to be seen whether they will survive motions for summary judgment.