Disability-Based Housing Discrimination Claims, Arising From Alleged Denial Due to Emotional Support Dog, Dismissed

In Manculich v. Five Riverside Towers Owners, Inc., 88 Misc. 3d 1264(A), 254 N.Y.S.3d 921 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2026), the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint alleging housing discrimination in the form of denying her application for tenancy in their building, based upon a disability that requires her use of a dog as an emotional support animal.

From the decision:

Claims of housing discrimination are evaluated under the burden-shifting framework set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). See, Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir. 2003); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038.1 On a claim of discrimination, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d at 47. Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for the challenged decision. Id. If the defendant makes such a showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the legitimate reasons offered by defendant were merely a pretext for discrimination. See Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000).

In the specific context of housing, “[t]o establish that a violation of the [FHA or] Human Rights Law occurred and that a reasonable accommodation should have been made, [Plaintiff] was required to demonstrate that she is disabled, that she is otherwise qualified for the tenancy, that because of her disability it is necessary for her to keep a dog in order for her to use and enjoy the apartment, and that reasonable accommodations could be made to allow her to keep a dog” Matter of 1 Toms Point Lane Corp. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 176 AD3d 930, 931 (2nd Dept. 2019), citing Matter of Kennedy St. Quad, Ltd. v. Nathanson, 62 AD3d 879 (2nd Dept. 2009); Hollendale Apts. & Health Club, LLC v. Bonesteel, 173 AD3d at 61; see, Sayeh v. 66 Madison Ave. Apt. Corp., 73 AD3d 459, 461 (1st Dept. 2010) (a prima facie case requires Plaintiff to demonstrate she was a member of a protected class, she sought to purchase an apartment and was qualified, she was rejected and the denial “occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination”).

Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff has established that she suffers from a disability and falls within a protected class, she must also establish she was a qualified tenant, and that her rejection was discriminatory. Defendant’s position is that Plaintiff was not qualified for tenancy and that it had no knowledge of her disability or need for a support dog, so their reason could not have been discriminatory.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not a qualified applicant because she was not approved by the Board following the interview (actually both interviews). Deficiencies were noted in both of her applications, as well as failures to follow rules. The first application was denied, in part, based on Plaintiff’s failure to abide by the rules and regulations of Defendant. The credible testimony of Defendant’s witnesses showed that Plaintiff had been notified that she violated the rules by having furniture deliveries made to the building without providing proper notifications. In addition, Plaintiff’s first application was incomplete in that it lacked required financial details. Likewise, even the second application was not complete. These violations and failures supported the Board’s conclusion that Plaintiff was not otherwise qualified for the tenancy.

Plaintiff was aware of the cooperative’s prohibition against pets. Despite that knowledge, when she submitted her first application, Plaintiff did not request a reasonable accommodation that would allow for a support animal. The day after the March 6, 2025 interview, Plaintiff submitted a note requesting such accommodation. Both Mr. Hanzes and Ms. Brundage testified that the decision to deny Plaintiff’s application was made immediately after the March 6, 2026 interview, prior to any discussion about disability, an emotional support animal and/or reasonable accommodations. The Court finds the testimony of Mr. Hanzes and Ms. Brundage credible and supported by the March 6, 2026 interview minutes (Exhibit C).

Plaintiff submitted the March 11, 2025 letter from Mr. Kramer which was supportive of her need for a support dog. But Mr. Kramer testified that prior to March 11, 2025 he had never prescribed a support animal for the Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff testified that a prior medical professional had prescribed a support animal, no evidence was submitted to support this claim.

Additionally, when given a second chance to apply, Plaintiff’s application was still deficient. Plaintiff failed to provide information regarding past and projected income. Moreover, even though she knew the reasons for the first denial, and she was given the opportunity to provide additional information regarding her financial stability, she failed to do so. She also could have provided some assurance of her willingness to adhere to the cooperative rules, but she did not. Instead, she failed to ensure that her application was fully complete, which was another example of not following the rules prescribed by the Defendant.

The court concluded that here, “Plaintiff’s failure to comply with cooperative rules and procedures was in no way connected to any claimed disability,” that “[t]he application was denied before any issue of disability or accommodation was even raised,” and that “there is some evidence of the claim for accommodation of a disability was an afterthought,” warranting dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint.

Share This:
© 2026 Pospis Law, PLLC. All Rights Reserved.