In Domanic v. Christian Bros. Auto. Corp., No. 25-20486, 2026 WL 2934867 (5th Cir. Sept. 30, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, by summary judgment, of a Jewish plaintiff’s discrimination claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The court summarized the facts, and procedural posture, as follows:
Christian Brothers Automotive Corporation is a faith-based auto-repair business that franchises only to Christians. All of its more than 250 franchisees—a group which includes some ethnic Jews—are professing Christians. When the company refused to franchise to Evan Domanic, who is an ethnic and religious Jew, Domanic sued for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted Christian Brothers summary judgment, ruling that its franchise policy constituted not racial but religious discrimination, which is not cognizable under § 1981.
On appeal, plaintiff’s main argument is that discrimination against Jews is ipso facto racial discrimination, even when (as here) the differential treatment is motivated purely by religion and not ancestry. The court declined to adopt this argument.
It reasoned:
While § 1981 does not use the term “race,” the section has long been understood to “prohibit[ ] racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts.” Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168–69, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976) (collecting authorities). Section 1981’s conception of race is broad: it protects “identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.” Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (emphasis added). It does not matter that, today, some ethnic or ancestral group (say, Germans or Swedes) might be considered “white” or “Caucasian.” See id. at 612, 107 S.Ct. 2022. The focus is instead on what groups Congress intended to protect when it enacted the law in 1870. See id. at 610, 107 S.Ct. 2022 (“The understanding of ‘race’ in the 19th century … was different. Plainly, all those who might be deemed Caucasian today were not thought to be of the same race at the time § 1981 became law.”).
It is also settled that § 1981 forbids discrimination on the basis of Jewish ethnicity or ancestry. In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 107 S.Ct. 2019, 95 L.Ed.2d 594 (1987), the Supreme Court confirmed that, at the time § 1981 (and its companion, § 1982) were enacted, “Jews constituted a group of people that Congress intended to protect.” Id. at 617, 107 S.Ct. 2019. “Jews and Arabs,” the Court explained, “were among the peoples then considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of the statute.” Id. at 617–18, 107 S.Ct. 2019. It is immaterial that Jews may be commonly classed as racially or ethnically “white” today. See id. at 618, 107 S.Ct. 2019; Lubavitch-Chabad of Ill., Inc. v. Nw. Univ., 772 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2014). A person of Jewish ancestry can nonetheless sue under § 1981 if he is discriminated against on the basis of that ancestry.
Finally, it is equally settled that § 1981 does not forbid religious discrimination. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 167, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (observing that “§ 1981 is in no way addressed to … categories of selectivity” such as “the right of a private school to limit its student body to … adherents of a particular religious faith”). Our court has confirmed that § 1981 does not reach claims of religious discrimination. See, e.g., Sibley v. Touro LCMC Health, No. 24-30189, 2024 WL 5118489, at *4 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024) (“§ 1981 ‘does not protect against religious discrimination.’ ” (quoting McCoy v. Homestead Studio Suites Hotels, 177 F. App’x 442, 445 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006))). So have our sister circuits.
While the district court, applying the McDonnell Douglas framework and found that plaintiff made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, it found that defendant demonstrated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refusing to contract with Domanic—namely, its Christian-only franchise policy—and also that Domanic failed to show this policy was a pretext for racial discrimination.
The uncontradicted evidence proved that defendant has a longstanding and consistent policy of franchising only to professing Christians, there was no evidence suggesting that this policy was a pretext for racial discrimination against persons of Jewish ancestry (or any other ancestry), and that defendant has franchised to two ethnic Jews who are professing Christians).
While noting the novelty of plaintiff’s argument that, as far as § 1981 is concerned, there is no distinction between discrimination based on Jewish ancestry and discrimination based on Jewish faith and that the statute “protect[s] Jews … regardless of whether they are religious or ethnic Jews,” the lower court correctly rejected this argument, as accepting it would “vitiate the established principle that § 1981 does not touch religious discrimination.”