Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

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In Cadet v. Deutsche Bank Securities, 11-cv-7964, 2013 WL 3090690 (SDNY June 18, 2013), decided on June 18, 2013, the Southern District of New York (McMahon, J.) denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s race discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981, but dismissed his…

Read More Plaintiff’s Title VII and Section 1981 Race Discrimination Claims Survive in Part
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Today the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, that retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must meet the more rigorous “but for” standard of causation applied under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.   The Court, focusing on the text, history, and structure…

Read More U.S. Supreme Court Raises Causation Standard For Title VII Retaliation Claims
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Today the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Vance v. Ball State University, which employees are “supervisors” within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  I previously wrote about the case here. Whether the alleged discriminator/harasser is the plaintiff’s “supervisor” or “co-worker” is critical: Under Title VII, an employer’s liability for ……

Read More U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Who Is A Title VII “Supervisor”
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A case recently decided by the Eastern District of New York, Smith v NYC Health and Hosp Corp., 10-cv-714 (EDNY June 18, 2013), illustrates the somewhat difficult task faced by employment discrimination plaintiffs and confirms that not all workplace adversity is actionable. In short, the law does not impose a “general civility code which prohibits all…

Read More Court Rejects Plaintiff’s Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation Claims
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In employment discrimination law, the phrase “hostile work environment” has a very specific meaning that does not encompass all circumstances that the word “hostile” might suggest. Courts repeatedly say, for example, that the employment laws do not provide a “general civility code” for the workplace. In addition, as set forth below, in order to be actionable, the…

Read More What is a “Hostile Work Environment”?
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Last week in Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Associates Consulting Engineers, P.C. the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s retaliation claims.  The facts, however, are not quite typical: [Plaintiff] quit her job as a human resources manager at her family business after complaining about an affair that one of her brothers, a vice president…

Read More Second Circuit Rejects “Sexual Favoritism” Claim And Clarifies The “Objectively Reasonable Belief” Element Of Retaliation
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Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.  The transcript is below.  I had previously written about the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the case (including the issues to be discussed) here. The issue is whether a plaintiff seeking to prove retaliation under Title…

Read More SCOTUS Hears Oral Argument On Title VII Retaliation Issue
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In Novak v. Waterfront Comm’n of NY Harbor (SDNY March 1, 2013), the Southern District dismissed plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim.  What makes this case unique is that the alleged harasser was the plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend. The court reiterated that “[t]he sine qua non of a gender-based discriminatory action claim under Title VII is that ‘the discrimination must…

Read More Unfair Treatment Was Due To Failed Romantic Relationship And Was Not “Because of Sex”
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Last week in Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., the Second Circuit held that the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of claims brought by former managing director Lisa Parisi – who is one of three women suing Goldman – that she was subjected to gender discrimination.  She contends that defendant…

Read More 2nd Circuit: Under Title VII “Pattern or Practice” Refers to a Method of Proof, Not a Substantive Right
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