In Mellett v. City of Philadelphia, No. 20-cv-1629-JMY, 2022 WL 2391141 (E.D.Pa. July 1, 2022), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
From the decision:
Plaintiff has brought forth evidence that Defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct occurred within days of her complaining about Lieutenant Frank’s conduct and that she was subjected to a pattern of antagonism. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that she reported to Captain Hearn that Lieutenant Frank called a female officer a “dyke” and complained that a female officer refused to give him “a blow job, not even a handy.” (ECF No. 19 at 47.) Lieutenant Frank and Captain Hearn subsequently spoke, and within days, Lieutenant Frank, Plaintiff’s superior, kicked in Plaintiff’s office door, screamed at her, and informed her that she could not keep an office while he was present. (ECF No. 19-4 at 5-6.) Lieutenant Frank allegedly yelled at Plaintiff on more than one occasion after Plaintiff reported his conduct. (Id.) When Captain Hearn held a meeting between the two to get them to call a “truce,” he allegedly told Plaintiff that everything she did must go through Lieutenant Frank, without taking further action or reporting Lieutenant Frank. (Id.) It was after this meeting that Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Office of Professional Responsibility and the investigation was flipped on her. According to Defendant, because Plaintiff reported Lieutenant Frank’s conduct in the context of a retaliation claim, she illogically did not report his conduct at all and therefore, warranted disciplinary charges. Plaintiff alleges that the purpose of these charges, which she was acquitted of, were retaliatory as they were meant to discourage female officers, like herself, from reporting a male officer’s sexual harassment of female employees. She also alleges that she was subsequently demoted as a result of reporting Lieutenant Frank’s conduct, though Defendant’s argue that her change in Sergeant roles did not amount to a demotion. A reasonable jury could certainly infer a causal connection between Plaintiff’s protected activity and Defendant’s subsequent adverse actions based on Defendant’s expressed hostility towards Plaintiff after she engaged in a protected activity.
The court concluded that “[v]iewing these facts most favorable to Plaintiff, we find that there is more than sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case of retaliation, and that there are genuine issues of material fact that may not be appropriately decided on a motion for summary judgment.”