In Lare v. Supreme Maintenance Inc., No. 1:22-cv-00007-WJ, 2022 WL 13821774 (D.N.M. Oct. 21, 2022), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s so-called “third party retaliation” claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In a somewhat unusual fact pattern, plaintiff asserts that he was terminated after, and because, his wife (who also worked for the defendant) complained of sexual harassment.
In assessing this claim, the court explained:
The Supreme Court has recognized third-party retaliation claims under Title VII. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 175-78 (2011). In Thompson, the plaintiff, Thompson, and his fiancée worked for the same company. Id. at 172. Thompson’s fiancée filed an EEOC charge alleging sex discrimination. Id. Three weeks later, Thompson was fired. Id. Thompson sued the company, alleging the company fired him in retaliation for his fiancée’s EEOC charge. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that Thompson had stated a claim for retaliation under Title VII. Id. at 178. First, the Supreme Court found the company’s firing of Thompson constituted unlawful retaliation under Title VII because Title VII prohibits an employer from taking an action that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 174. The Supreme Court found it “obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fiancée would be fired”; thus, the Court concluded firing Thompson was an unlawful act of retaliation under Title VII. Id. Next, the Court addressed the “more difficult question”: whether Thompson could sue the company under Title VII for the alleged retaliation. Id. at 175. The Court allowed Thompson’s claim to proceed because he qualified as a “person … aggrieved” under Title VII. Id. at 178. In so concluding, the Court rejected the argument that only employees who engaged in protected activity can sue under Title VII. Id. at 177. Instead of requiring that an employee have engaged in protected activity to sue under Title VII, the Supreme Court required only that an employee “fall within the zone of interest protected by Title VII.” Id. at 178. Applying the “zone of interest” test, the Court held that suit may be brought under Title VII “by any plaintiff with an interest ‘arguably [sought] to be protected by the statute.’ ” Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
Here, the facts alleged by Plaintiff Lare strongly parallel those alleged by the plaintiff in Thompson. Both Mr. Thompson and Mr. Lare worked with their significant other—fiancée and spouse, respectively—at the same company. Both Thompson’s and Lare’s significant other engaged in protected activity, and both Thompson and Lare were allegedly fired in retaliation for their significant other’s protected activity.
The court concluded that “[g]iven the strong similarities between the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint and those alleged in Thompson, the Court has little difficulty concluding—like the Supreme Court did in Thompson—that Plaintiff Lare falls within the zone of interest Congress sought to protect under Title VII and accordingly alleges sufficient facts for his retaliation claim to survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.”