In Navarro v. Town of Stratford, No. 3:22-cv-01254 (VAB), 2024 WL 4008229 (D.Conn. August 30, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s hostile work environment asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
After summarizing the black-letter law, the court applied it to the facts. In finding summary judgment-defeating issues of fact on the issue of the existence of a hostile work environment, the court explained:
Defendant argues that while Mr. Navarro may have experienced unfriendly, annoying, and immature behaviors, those “innocuous comments and actions” did not rise to conduct that a reasonable jury could see as hostility resulting from racial animus. Mem. at 21–22.
In response, Mr. Navarro argues that his co-workers made a variety of racially and ethnically derogatory comments that, although they were not all directed at him, could allow a rational factfinder to conclude that he was subject to a hostile work environment. Opp’n at 14–15.The Court agrees.
In a hostile work environment claim, “ ‘the crucial inquiry focuses on the nature of the workplace environment as a whole,’ and ‘a plaintiff who [himself] experiences discriminatory harassment need not be the target of other instances of hostility in order for those incidents to support [his] claim.’ ” Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 546 (citations omitted). Even if the discriminatory conduct is “merely episodic and not itself severe, the addition of physically threatening … behavior may cause offensive or boorish conduct to cross the line into actionable … harassment.” Id. at 547 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
And “facially neutral incidents may be included … among the totality of the circumstances” as long as “a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that they were, in fact, based on [race].” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 378 (2d Cir. 2002). To find such facially neutral events relevant, “some circumstantial or other basis” must exist “for inferring that [the] incidents … were in fact discriminatory.” Id. This circumstantial evidence may include evidence that “the same individual” engaged in “multiple acts of harassment,” some of which were overtly discriminatory. Id. at 375.
Additionally, “incidents relating to other minorities … may be of limited probative value, but cannot be ignored on summary judgment.” Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 71 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original) (quoting Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Mr. Navarro testified that on his first day of work, Mr. Walsh asked Mr. Navarro whether he “wanted the rope now or do you want the rope later.” Id. at 69:2–7. Mr. Navarro alleges that Mr. Scala informed him that this was in reference to the employee formerly assigned to Mr. Navarro’s toolbox, who died by suicide with a rope. Id. at 71: 14–25. Mr. Walsh also allegedly asked why the cleaning lady works at the Town Garage if she did not know English. Id. at 75:17–22.
As to Mr. Varza, Mr. Navarro testified that, every couple of weeks, Mr. Varza would smash his hammer on the bench as Mr. Navarro walked by and remark “[y]ou don’t have the qualifications I have” any time Mr. Navarro made a mistake. Navarro Dep., Ex. 1 at 88:4–17.
Mr. Navarro also alleges that Mr. Varza and Mr. Walsh would comment that Mr. Navarro got his position because he must know the Deputy Public Works Director, who is also Hispanic. Navarro Dep., Ex. B at 142:14–16.
Mr. Navarro also testified that Mr. Scala made numerous racists comments, including that Black people “don’t belong here,” that Black people should be put back “to being slaves again,” “Hispanics don’t belong here,” “Puerto Rico doesn’t exist” and Puerto Ricans “don’t belong here,” Mexicans were “crossing over,” “Jamaica doesn’t exist,” and that they were all “made up countries” and that “Italians made up everything.” Navarro Dep. Ex. 1 at 57:16–58:10, 123:21–126:11. Mr. Navarro alleges that Mr. Scala made these comments approximately four times. Navarro Dep., Ex. B at 150:17–20. Mr. Navarro also testified that Mr. Scala made jokes about “the Floyd case, about the black gentleman that actually got shot,”4 and about Black people generally. Id. at 57:11–15.While the Town of Stratford argues that these allegations are “innocuous” and “run-of-the-mill complaints,” insufficient to serve as a basis for a hostile work environment, Mem. at 22, considering all of Mr. Navarro’s allegations together, and in the light most favorable to Mr. Navarro, a reasonably jury could conclude that this work environment was “severe or pervasive enough that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive[,]” Raspardo, 770 F.3d at 114 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22), on the basis of race.
“While a few isolated racial slurs may not create a hostile work environment for Title VII purposes, the repeated use of certain clearly offensive and abusive language can create a hostile work environment.” Owens v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, No. 11 CIV. 8297 (ALC), 2013 WL 150245, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2013). And Mr. Navarro has presented sufficient admissible evidence to establish issues of material fact as to whether he was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of race. See Kemp v. CSX Transp., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 197, 212 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (determining that there was sufficient admissible evidence in the record to establish issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs were subjected to a hostile work environment where they alleged that “they were subjected to vulgar racial language throughout their employment and often viewed racial slurs and Confederate flags displayed prominently on walls of regional offices” and identified “several specific employees who used racial slurs in their presence on specific occasions”).
On this record, “[t]he Court cannot say that the application of the law to the present facts will reasonably support only one ultimate conclusion.” Notaro v. Fossil Indus., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d 452, 455, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that “sufficient evidence exist[ed] to raise an issue of material fact as to whether [the defendant’s] behavior rose to the level of an actionable claim for sexual harassment such that a jury could find the existence of a hostile work environment” where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant “continually and abusively harassed the Plaintiffs by utilizing sexually charged language” and “on a regular basis, … would throw and punch things in the office and would curse solely at [the plaintiffs]”).
The court proceeded to find an issue of fact as to employer liability, pointing to “ample evidence that Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent and correct the discriminatory conduct he alleges because it took Mr. Ing over a month to interview Mr. Navarro following his initial complaint, because Defendant concluded that no response to Mr. Navarro’s complaint was necessary, and because the harassment continued.”