In Kueh v. New York and Presbyterian Hospital, 2024 WL 4882172 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate religion claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
The second and third causes of action allege failure to accommodate under Title VII and NYCHRL, respectively. To determine whether Kueh states a plausible claim to relief for failure to accommodate in violation of Title VII, I must consider whether the allegations in the Complaint plausibly allege that (1) he “held a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement”; (2) he “informed [his] employer[ ] of this belief”; and (3) he was “disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” Baker v. The Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001)). Once a prima facie case is established, the employer “must offer [the employee] a reasonable accommodation, unless doing so would cause the employer to suffer an undue hardship.” Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Knight, 275 F.3d at 167). “ ‘[U]ndue hardship’ is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 468 (2023).
Here I find that Kueh makes out a prima facie case of religious discrimination. First, he believes that vaccinations run contrary to the teachings of his religion. (Compl. ¶¶ 28–30, 36, 54; see also id. Ex. A). Receiving a COVID-19 vaccine was mandated by Kueh’s employer. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 33, 35, 47.) Thus, a conflict existed between Kueh’s religious beliefs and the requirements of his employment. Second, Kueh informed NYP, his employer, of this conflict by submitting a religious exemption request in response to the announcement of the NYP COVID Policy. (Id. ¶ 27.) Third, Kueh’s employment was terminated for his failure to comply with the NYP COVID Policy.
The court next addressed the question of whether defendant could reasonably accommodate his request to work remotely without suffering undue hardship. As to this point, the court held that it was plausible that plaintiff can perform his role remotely without presenting a substantial burden in the context of defendant’s business, and thus that plaintiff’s Title VII failure-to-accommodate claim survives defendant’s motion to dismiss.
It further found that plaintiff sufficiently stated a failure-to-accommodate claim under the more liberal New York City Human Rights Law.