In Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc. et al, Case No. 24-cv-01368-JSC, 2025 WL 405699 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 5, 2025), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff plausibly stated a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws, and therefore, denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, since plaintiff’s claims were covered by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Harassment Act (EFAA).
From the decision:
Dr. Ding plausibly states an NYCHRL claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment. Defendant Stevens expressed a preference to hire a man for the CFO position, though the Board, “to emphasize ‘gender diversity’ in its recruitment efforts,” did not. From the time she began working for Defendant Structure Therapeutics (the “Company”), Defendants “almost immediately began to sideline Dr. Ding and not allow her to perform the primary functions of her position.” Defendant Stevens “diminished Dr. Ding’s roles on various projects and instead directed her to read and listen for her first year with the company.” Defendant Stevens reiterated comments to Dr. Ding that she “was ‘too aggressive’ ” and that investment bankers felt “lectured” by her. “If Dr. Ding was a man, these ‘Wolves of Wall Street’ never would have opined that she was being ‘too aggressive’ or that she had been ‘lecturing them.’ Rather than recognizing these sexist comments, Defendant Stevens adopted and ratified their behavior, and later would use such sexist opinions to form a pretextual basis for terminating Dr. Ding.” When Dr. Ding later informed Defendants of physical injuries suffered from a domestic violence incident, Defendant Stevens remarked “I can hardly see anything. You may be more sensitive to it than others.” Days later, Defendant Stevens pressured Dr. Ding not to attend executive meetings, asked her repeatedly to reconsider her role as CFO in light of her domestic violence incident, and recommended her termination to the Board.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in Dr. Ding’s favor, Defendants subjected her to unwanted gender-based conduct and as such she has been treated less well than other employees because of her gender. Defendant Stevens’s noted preference for a male CFO, reiteration of sexist comments about her “aggressive[ness],” and belittling Dr. Ding’s domestic violence experience, support an inference the conduct was based on Dr. Ding’s gender and created a hostile work environment. Further, Defendants’ assumptions about Dr. Ding’s ability to do her job both at the outset and after having suffered from domestic violence support an inference of unwanted gender-based conduct. While Defendants argue this conduct is “gender neutral”, drawing all reasonable inferences in Dr. Ding’s favor, the Court cannot conclude at this early stage that these actions do not support an inference of gender-based animus creating a hostile work environment. And though certain comments in a vacuum may appear gender-neutral, the Court considers the conduct as a whole, not piecemeal. … Thus, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true, Dr. Ding plausibly states an NYCHRL sexual harassment claim.
[Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]
The court likewise held that plaintiff sufficiently pled a sexual harassment claim under the New York State Human Rights Law. Of note, the court explained that “the EFAA does not require courts to impose a distinction between sexual harassment that is lewd, romantic, or sexual and that which is not when the state law itself does not do so” and defines the term “sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law” and that “[h]ere, New York has defined sexual harassment under its own law—the NYSHRL—to mean a person was subjected to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of [sex].” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]