In Kapllanaj v. Healthfirst PHSP, Inc., No. 152720/2021, 2025 WL 1707852 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County June 17, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s gender discrimination and hostile work environment claims asserted under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
The court summarized the facts as follows:
From April 23, 2001, until May 4, 2020, Plaintiff was employed at Healthfirst. Plaintiff’s job was to help people enroll in health insurance programs. For most of her tenure, Plaintiff worked at Maimonides Pediatric at 1301 57th Street, Brooklyn. New York. Plaintiff’s workstation was changed to Healthfirst Bensonhurst’s office, allegedly because there was planned construction at Maimonides Pediatric. In 2018, Papyan became Plaintiffs supervisor and allegedly began making sexual comments towards her, including calling her beautiful, telling her what to wear, and telling other females that they should wear short skirts like Plaintiff. He also allegedly said a beautiful woman like Plaintiff shouldn’t associate with another female coworker who Papyan implied was ugly Papyan also allegedly pulled his chair next to Plaintiff to work right beside her on multiple occasions, making her uncomfortable. Plaintiff testified he heard Papyan express hatred towards other female managers and colleagues. Plaintiff complained to other Healthfirst employees and Healthfirst’s human resources that she felt Papyan was sexually harassing her. After rebuffing him and complaining about Papyan, Plaintiff’s work came under increasing scrutiny. Eventually, in September of 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to work with a different manager at a Queens location. Glenys Bisono, Plaintiff’s new director, recommended she be terminated for three years of poor performance evaluations. In May of 2020, Plaintiff was terminated. [Citations omitted; paragraphing altered.]
Applying the law, the court held:
There is no dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class – namely she is a woman, nor can it be disputed that she was qualified for the position, as she had been employed at Healthfirst for 19 years. Moreover, she suffered adverse employment actions – namely termination, but also, she was subjected to far greater scrutiny after complaining about sexual harassment. Moreover, although her work location was not yet under construction, she was forced to move from her prior work location of many years to the less busy Bensonhurst office under the alleged pretext of planned construction.
Finally, the adverse employment actions occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination – she was terminated for a history of poor work performance, but this did not take into account that at least one of the performance evaluations relied on was conducted by her alleged harasser. Moreover, Plaintiff provided sworn testimony that her supervisor, Papyan, frequently referred to her as beautiful, told her not to associate with other women he believed were ugly, and instructed other employees to wear short skirts like Plaintiff. For purposes of raising a triable issue of fact defeating summary judgment, these acts, which allegedly occurred on numerous occasions, give rise to an inference of gender-based discrimination – especially as there is no evidence that Papyan made similar comments about male employees’ appearance and clothing (see Suri v Grey Global Group, Inc., 164 AD3d 108 [1st Dept 2018]).
Although Defendants proffer poor work performance as a legitimate and nondiscriminatory basis for Plaintiff’s alleged termination, Defendants fail to resolve a central issue of fact: whether Plaintiff received poor work performance evaluations from prior supervisors, including Papyan, because of her complaints about sexual harassment (see also Bond v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp, 215 AD3d 469, 470 [1st Dept 2023). As Papyan, the alleged discriminator, authored a performance evaluation relied upon to terminate Plaintiff, a jury might reasonably find that gender discrimination played a role in Plaintiff’s termination in violation of the New York State and City Human Rights Laws. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s gender-based discrimination claims is denied.
For the same reason, the motion for summary judgment dismissing the hostile work environment claim is denied. Plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact as to whether she suffered a hostile work environment due to being a woman. Plaintiff testified that when she expressed discomfort from Papyan’s advances, everyone in the Bensonhurst office began treating her coldly – without even saying good morning. She also claims she came under more intense scrutiny and was given an erratic and ever-changing schedule. This testimony, without any evidence definitively contradicting it, requires a jury to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment.
The court further denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim, but granted it as to plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.