In Katz v. NYC Housing Preservation & Development et al, No. 100949/2024, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 51290(U), 2025 WL 2414472 (Sup Ct, Aug. 18, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of discrimination based on familial status under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
In reaching its conclusion, the court interpreted the relevant provisions of these statutes to conclude that family size is not a protected class:
The plain language of the NYSHRL defines “familial status” as a class of individuals with children. Nothing in the definition indicates that family size is a protected element of this class, only the status of having a child or children. Nor is family size included among the list of protected classes set forth in the Executive Law (Executive Law § 296 [5] [a] [1]). When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, “the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof” (Kuzmich v 50 Murray St. Acquisition LLC, 34 NY3d 84, 91 [2019]). As the Court of Appeals has consistently reiterated, “courts should construe unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning” (id.). Whereas the plain language of the statute indicates that family size is not a protected class under the NYSHRL, this court need look no further with respect to this issue.
Similar to the NYSHRL, the plain language of the NYCHRL bars discrimination “because children are, may be or would be residing with such person or persons,” without reference to family size or the number of persons residing together. This unambiguous language indicates that the relevant protected class consists of all persons residing with children. The NYCHRL was amended in 2005 and 2016 to clarify that the statute “shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New York state civil and human rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to provisions of this title, have been so construed” (McCabe v 511 W 232nd Owners Corp., — NE3d —, 2024 NY Slip Op 06290, *1 [2024]). Nevertheless, “[e]ven if the NYCHRL was intended to be more protective than the state and federal counterparts, and even if its legislative history contemplates that the Law be independently construed with the aim of making it the most progressive in the nation, the NYCHRL still must be interpreted based on its plain meaning” (id.). Interpretations of the NYCHRL “must be reasonable and grounded in the language of the local law” (McCabe, 2024 NY Slip Op 06290 at *2). Applying this standard, there is no reasonable basis for this court to conclude that family size is a protected class under the NYCHRL.
Accordingly, dismissal of plaintiff’s familial status discrimination claims was warranted.