In Samah v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:25-CV-10158-JEK, 2026 WL 63399 (D. Mass. Jan. 8, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race-based hostile work environment claims.
From the decision:
Counts 5 and 9 assert that Takeda violated Title VII and Chapter 151B, respectively, by subjecting Samah to a racially hostile work environment. “ ‘When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.’ ” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). Title VII is also violated when harassment is “so unbearable that [the employee is] forced to resign and [is] thus constructively discharged.” Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough Del Caribe Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 45 (1st Cir. 2003); see Che v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 44 (1st Cir. 2003) (hostile work environment claim does not “requir[e] that the plaintiff be actually or constructively discharged”). To sustain his Title VII hostile work environment claim, Samah must plead “offensive, race-based conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment and is subjectively perceived by [him] as abusive.” Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico, 212 F.3d 607, 613 (1st Cir. 2000). Likewise, the Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted Section 4(1) of Chapter 151B “to provide a cause of action for a hostile work environment based on the cumulative effect of a series of abusive acts though each in isolation might not be actionable in itself.” Windross, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 863 (citing Clifton v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 445 Mass. 611, 616 n.5 (2005)). To state such a claim, Samah must allege that Takeda was “ ‘pervaded by harassment or abuse,’ ” such that “ ‘the resulting intimidation, humiliation, and stigmatization’ ” posed “ ‘a formidable barrier to the full participation of an individual in the workplace.’ ” Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 532 (2001) (quoting College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 162 (1987)).
Samah sufficiently alleges that Takeda subjected him to a hostile work environment, where he was “bullied and harassed because of his race.” ECF 14, ¶¶ 65, 69. This is so for the same reasons, and based on the same allegations, that his constructive discharge claims survived dismissal. The Supreme Court has recognized that “a hostile-work-environment claim is a ‘lesser included component’ of the ‘graver claim of hostile-environment constructive discharge.’ ” Green, 578 U.S. at 559 (quoting Suders, 542 U.S. at 149); accord O’Horo, 131 F.4th at 22. In other words, to sustain a constructive discharge claim, a plaintiff must allege “harassment at least as severe (if not more) than that required for a hostile work environment claim.” Reyes v. Garland, 26 F.4th 516, 522 (1st Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).
The court concluded that because plaintiff has “plausibly alleged constructive discharge, he also states claims of a racially hostile work environment.”