In Corcino v. The New York Times Co., No. 160247/2024, 2026 WL 964814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 07, 2026), the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s discrimination claims, in light of a prior release between the parties.
The court summarized the facts as follows:
Defendant formerly employed Plaintiff as a Software Engineering Manager. The employment relationship ended on May 30, 2024. Plaintiff, while represented by counsel, negotiated and signed a severance package with a separation agreement and general release (the “Release”). Plaintiff received her entire severance and now sues Defendant for employment discrimination, retaliation, and a declaratory judgment claiming the Release is unenforceable. Defendant moves to dismiss based on the Release, arguing the Release bars the discrimination and retaliation claims, and the Release is valid under GOL § 5-336. Plaintiff opposes by arguing the Release is invalid under GOL § 5-336.
In general, GOL § 5-336(1)(a) bars any non-disclosure agreement included “in any settlement, agreement, or resolution of any claim, the factual foundation for which involves discrimination, harassment, or retaliation…any term or condition that would prevent the disclosure of the underlying facts and circumstances to the claim or action unless the condition of confidentiality is the complainant’s preference.”
In reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned:
The Release is not void under GOL § 5-336 because it expressly states “nothing in this Agreement shall have the purpose or effect of requiring Employee to conceal the details or underlying facts and circumstances of claims of discrimination or sexual harassment on the basis of a characteristic protected by applicable law that does not involve revealing non-public trade secrets, business plans, and customer information” (NYSCEF Doc. 10 at ¶ 6). Thus, nothing in the Release would prohibit Plaintiff from paying liquified damages for speaking about unlawful discrimination, so long as Plaintiff does not reveal trade secrets or proprietary information. The legislative history demonstrates that GOL § 5-336 was never intended to make all non-disclosure and non-disparagement clauses, such as those pertaining to trade secrets and proprietary information, unenforceable. The legislative intent was to make unenforceable certain nondisclosure and non-disparagement clauses that imposed liquidated damages on a complainant for disclosing facts related to retaliation, discrimination, or harassment. The non-disclosure and mutual non-disparagement clauses here expressly contain carve outs that allow Plaintiff to disclose facts related to discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.
Because the Release is enforceable, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed. “A release will not be treated lightly because it is ‘a jural act of high significant without which the settlement of disputes would be rendered all but impossible’ ” (see Allen v Rises Organization, Inc., 106 AD3d 514, 516 [1st Dept 2013] quoting Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d 556, 563 [1969]). A valid release that is clear and unambiguous and knowingly and voluntarily entered into will be enforced and bars an action or any cause of action arising prior to its execution (Smith v City of New York, 236 AD3d 414, 416 [1st Dept 2025]).
The Release clearly and unambiguously states that by accepting severance pay, Plaintiff waived her “right to recover any individual relief (including any backpay, front pay, reinstatement or other legal or equitable relief) in any charge, complaint, or lawsuit or other proceeding brought” (see NYSCEF Doc. 10 at ¶ 6). The Release also recites Plaintiff had an opportunity to review the Release with counsel of her choosing, fully understood the significance of all terms, and entered the Release voluntarily (id. at ¶ 4[e]). Plaintiff accepted the severance pay and extended insurance coverage without ever repudiating the agreement, thereby ratifying it (see Dinhofer v Medical Liability Mut. Ins. Co., 92 AD3d 480, 481 [1st Dept 2012]). Moreover, the First Department has held releases of discrimination claims are not substantively unconscionable.
Accordingly, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5).