In Parker v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, Inc., No. 21-CV-7196 (VEC), 2022 WL 16833626 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2022), the court discussed and applied the “administrative exhaustion” requirement for asserting a claim in court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Specifically, it denied plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint to add a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII, since it would be futile.
From the decision:
It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge explicitly raised disability-based discrimination only. Plaintiff argues that her proposed Title VII claim is “reasonably related” to her EEOC charge, however, because she originally challenged Sheikh’s decision to fire her, “stated that she was a woman,” and discussed “unfavorable treatment compared with a male colleague” whom she had asked to take notes during a meeting.Plaintiff’s argument boils down to: she identified herself as a woman and the supervisor she accuses of discriminatory conduct is a man and therefore the EEOC was on notice that she was complaining about sex discrimination. Caselaw firmly establishes that such passing references to gender are inadequate. See Warshun v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 2d 259, 268–69 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding that when plaintiffs sought to bring race-based discrimination claims “aris[ing] out of the same conduct” discussed in their EEOC charges but “[t]he only reference to race in the EEOC charges” was plaintiffs’ “respective self-descriptions as Caucasian,” plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with respect to their reverse racial discrimination claims); Walsh v. Nat’l Westminster Bancorp., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 168, 171–72 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding that where retaliatory conduct discussed in a plaintiff’s EEOC charge “lack[ed] any sexual dimension,” the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her sexual harassment claim); Dennis v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 288, 290–91 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (concluding that “the facts given by plaintiff to the EEOC in her race claim were not sufficient to apprise the EEOC that a possible age claim was also lurking in the case” because, inter alia, “the allegation that plaintiff retired earlier than she would have because of racial discrimination d[id] not ipso facto raise an inference of age discrimination”).[Cleaned up.]
The court further held that plaintiff’s claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws would likewise be futile, since the proposed sex discrimination claims would be time-barred (and, particularly, that since they were based on newly-alleged conduct the amended complaint did not “relate back” to the original complaint).