Failure to File EEOC Charge Dooms Discrimination Claims

A recent case, Philippe v. Weckers, 2023 WL 4085880 (D.Md. June 20, 2023), illustrates the “administrative exhaustion” principle that is an integral component of federal employment discrimination law.

Here, plaintiff did not take the necessary first step of filing a discrimination complaint with the EEOC, warranting dismissal:

As an initial matter, the complaint and the undisputed factual record before the Court makes clear that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this employment discrimination action. Under Title VII and the ADEA, Plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC, or the equivalent State agency, before filing suit in this Court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (ADEA); see Calvert Grp., 551 F.3d at 300. This “exhaustion requirement ensures that the employer is put on notice of the alleged violations so that the matter can be resolved out of court if possible.” Miles, 429 F.3d at 491; see also Southpeak, 777 F.3d at 670 (“We recognize that a primary objective of exhaustion requirements is to put parties on notice of the allegations against them.”). And so, Plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies with the EEOC before bringing this action. See Puryear v. Cnty. of Roanoke, 214 F.3d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he aggrieved person may initiate a civil action based on the Title VII claims made in his EEOC charge only after receipt of a right-to-sue letter.”).

In this case, Plaintiff does not dispute that he did not file his employment discrimination claims with the EEOC before commencing this action. ECF No.1-2 at 6-7; see also ECF No. 18 at 12. The complaint is also devoid of any evidence to show that Plaintiff sought to exhaust his administrative remedies before commencing this litigation.3 See ECF No. 1-2 at 6-7.

Accordingly, the court concluded that “Plaintiff has not satisfied this mandatory prerequisite for bringing his employment discrimination claims under Title VII and the ADEA,” warranting the granting of defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims.

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