In M.H. v. Starbucks Coffee Company, 2023 WL 5211023 (S.D.N.Y. August 13, 2023), the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of a sex-based hostile work environment asserted under the New York State Human Rights Law.
Here, plaintiff, while 17 years old, was raped by her shift supervisor (Justin Mariani) at defendant Starbucks; Mariani since pleaded guilty to this crime.
The sole issue addressed by the court was whether Starbucks could be held liable for this horrific conduct under the applicable law. The answer, according to the court, is “no.”
This case illustrates a crucial difference between the New York State Human Rights Law, on the one hand, and its federal and New York City counterparts (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York City Human Rights Law), on the other, on the issue of when an individual’s conduct is imputed to their employer.
The court summarized this distinction as follows:
It is true that, for the most part, “[h]ostile work environment claims under both Title VII and the NYSHRL are governed by the same standard.” Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2013). “There [is an] important distinction[ ], however,” between the two laws. Marchuk v. Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, 100 F. Supp. 3d 302, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Specifically, under Title VII, employers are strictly and vicariously liable for “an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor,” subject only to an affirmative defense that an employer may raise. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). But under the NYSHRL, “an employer is never strictly liable for the conduct of employees, even if the harassing employee is the Plaintiff’s supervisor.” Marchuk, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 307.5 Instead, a “private employer … [can] not be held liable under the State HRL for an employee’s discriminatory act ‘unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.’ ”
[Cleaned up.]
Applying the law, the court explained:
Under the applicable standard, Starbucks cannot be held liable for Mariani’s acts because Plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded that Starbucks “became a party to [them] by encouraging, condoning, or approving [them].” Forrest, 3 N.Y.3d at 311. To start, Plaintiff does not allege or argue that Starbucks encouraged, condoned, or approved of the rape itself, given that Mariani was fired just six days after the rape occurred. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 37.7 Instead, the conduct that Plaintiff alleges that Starbucks inappropriately condoned are Mariani’s prior “lewd, unwelcome comments,” his “inappropriate physical touch,” and an alleged prior relationship (or relationships) with female employees. See id. ¶¶ 19–24.8
The problem for Plaintiff is that the complaint states that, after learning about the allegations against Mariani, Starbucks gave him “a final written warning” that was signed on April 2, 2021. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. In other words, according to the complaint itself, Starbucks took disciplinary action to address Mariani’s behavior. To be sure, and as Plaintiff argues in her complaint and briefing, it is entirely reasonable to question whether this response was sufficient; indeed, given the crime that Mariani would later commit, it is impossible not to think that Starbucks should have taken significantly greater corrective measures. But the standard under the NYSHRL is that to be liable for an employee’s harassment, the employer must have been made “a party” to the misconduct by “encouraging, condoning, or approving it.” Forrest, 3 N.Y.3d at 311. And while “[a]n employer’s calculated inaction in response to discriminatory conduct may … indicate condonation,” St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 N.Y.2d at 687, a good-faith response to address misconduct precludes a conclusion that an employer has condoned misbehavior even if reasonable people could find that response insufficient.
In sum, plaintiff’s complaint “does not allege that Starbucks’ discipline—in the form of a final written warning to Mariani—was anything other than a genuine (if insufficient) disciplinary measure” and “thus does not plausibly allege that Starbucks encouraged, approved, or condoned his actions.”
The court did, however, grant plaintiff leave to amend her complaint.