In Griffin v. City of New York, No. 157357/2022, 2023 WL 6465003 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Oct. 04, 2023), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a sex-based hostile work environment claim under the New York City – but not the New York State – Human Rights Law.
This decision, as such, offers instructive guidance on the difference between the two statutes.
From the decision:
Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims is granted, in part. Under the NYSHRL, a “hostile work environment exists ‘[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment” (Hunter v Barnes & Noble, Inc, 2023 NY Slip Op 30638[U], 8-9 [Sup Ct, NY County 2023] [internal citations and quotations omitted]). The conduct at issue must “alter the conditions of the victim’s employment by being subjectively perceived as abusive by the plaintiff such that a reasonable person to find that the environment was objectively hostile or abusive” (Id.). Plaintiff has failed to satisfy this standard–even crediting plaintiff’s characterization of Ceparano’s criticism of her as “soft,” too “friendly,” and “weak” as gender-based, these “remarks can be characterized at most as petty slights or trivial inconveniences” (Sedhom v SUNY Downstate Med. Ctr., 201 AD3d 536, 538 [1st Dept 2022]). Moreover, plaintiff’s “allegations of non-promotion, and pretextual investigation do not constitute the severe or pervasive ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ required to state a hostile work environment cause of action under the NYSHRL (Hunter v Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 30638[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2023] quoting Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 310-311 [2004]); see also Khalil v State, 17 Misc 3d 777, 784 [Sup Ct, NY County 2007]). Accordingly, plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim under the NYSHRL is dismissed.
To state a hostile work environment claim under the NYCHRL, however, plaintiff need only allege facts showing that “she has been treated less well than other employees because of her protected status or that discrimination was one of the motivating factors for the defendant’s conduct” (Chin v. New York City Hous. Auth., 106 AD3d 443, 445 [1st Dept 2013] citing Williams v NYCHA, 61 AD3d at 75-78 [2013]). Plaintiff has satisfied this first category through allegations that she was denied desirable positions that would have maximized her earnings that were instead given to male sergeants and faced discipline that male colleagues did not face (See e.g., Valcarcel v First Quality Maintenance, 41 Misc 3d 1222(A) [Sup Ct, Queens County 2013]). Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim under the NYCHRL is denied.
The court further denied defendant’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under NYCHRL § 8-107(13)(b), which provides for vicarious liability under certain circumstances. Here, plaintiff’s complaint “sufficiently alleges that Ceparano holds a supervisory position through which he controlled ‘many tangible aspects of Plaintiff’s job duties,’ and personally participate[d] in discrimination, retaliation, and other unlawful workplace practices targeted.”