In Schussler v. The Dept. of Educ. of the City of New York, No. 154316/2017, 2024 WL 3203264 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County June 27, 2024) denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of religion-based discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law.
Initially, the court determined that defendants made a prima facie showing in support of their motion. It continued:
Notwithstanding, viewing the evidence proffered by all sides in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, this court finds that there are issues of fact sufficient to defeat Defendants’ motion. Where, as here, Defendants have moved for summary judgment and have offered evidence in admissible form of one or more nondiscriminatory motivations for their actions, it is incumbent upon the court to scrutinize whether the evidence proffered, when set against Plaintiff’s characterizations, could be construed as false, misleading, or incomplete (see Bennet v. Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 92 AD3d 29 [1st Dept 2011]). Because discrimination can at times only be understood from the eyes of the beholder, and recognizing that a central premise of the NYCHRL is to resist efforts to deprive alleged victims of discrimination of a full and fair hearing before a jury of their peers by means of summary judgment (see Williams v. New York City Housing Authority, 872 NYS2d 27 [1st Dept 2009]), summary judgment is disfavored where a potentially equally persuasive account could be made by the alleged victim as well as the alleged perpetrator.
Here, in opposition to Defendants’ prima facie showing, Plaintiff has highlighted that Luft came to Rincón with a reputation for being “the closer.” Luft claims that she did not talk to the superintendent, prior principals, or anyone who had previously observed Plaintiff teaching. However, on the second day she was at Rincón, she conducted an observation of Plaintiff. This was the only opportunity she had to observe Plaintiff, as he went out on leave shortly thereafter. Plaintiff claims that Luft targeted him, held only one observation to document a reason for his termination, and then went through with a pre-determined decision to adversely impact his employment. To divorce such an inference from mere innuendo or conjecture, Plaintiff underscores that he began experiencing discrimination when he asked for days off in October 2014 for the religious holiday of Sukkot (Plaintiff Aff ¶ 9). Plaintiff recalls that when he did, Wilson angrily responded and demanded documentation from his religious institution (Plaintiff Aff ¶ 10). Additionally, Plaintiff underscores that Wilson questioned the validity of Plaintiff’s request by searching for the days of observance in Israel, which are different from the days of observance in the United States (Plaintiff Aff ¶ 11). Wilson followed this by calling Plaintiff’s home on the first morning of religious observance to tell him that he did not put the reason for his absence in the computer, something she had not previously told Plaintiff to do. Plaintiff argues that this excuse was merely a pretext for checking to make sure that Plaintiff was using the day off as a religious observance (Plaintiff Aff ¶ 12). Plaintiff asserts that he was also given a letter in his file in 2014 for “belittling students,” despite not engaging in such behavior. Plaintiff also notes that he took issue when Wilson repeatedly requested that Plaintiff take classes on Saturdays to help him develop in areas despite knowing that he is a practicing Orthodox Jew (Plaintiff Aff ¶ 15).
Plaintiff notes that his supervisors also refused to provide him with a phone in his classroom since October 2016, despite his numerous requests. Plaintiff states that this created an unsafe situation for him, particularly given that the principal had previously been physically attacked by a student (Plaintiff Aff ¶ 16). Plaintiff also states that he was wrongfully forced to sign an extension of probation through September 2017, six months prior to the expiration of his probation. All of this, in Plaintiff’s view, was motivated by religious and gender based animus, especially when viewed through the prism of Defendants’ surrounding actions.
Plaintiff further highlights that a decision was made to terminate him while he was on leave based on a single observation from Luft in early June 2017. The very next day after she arrived and having never been at the school nor spoken to the prior principal, Luft observed Plaintiff at the end of the day on May 4, 2017. Based on this single observation and a review of his personnel file, Luft recommended Plaintiff’s discontinuance, as she never conducted another observation since Plaintiff went out on leave the following week. She did not speak to anyone other than that the assistant principal, who never observed Plaintiff (see Luft Deposition Tr., NYSCEF Doc. 45 at Pg. 29, 20-25; Pg. 30, 2-3; Pg. 31, 7-11; Pg. 32, 13-25; Pg. 33, 2-7, 12-17, 24-25; Pg. 34, 3-6). Plaintiff underscores that the observation conducted on May 4th was entirely negative and did not point out one thing that Plaintiff was doing correctly. Moreover, Plaintiff mentions that Luft failed to identify specific remediation tailored to him.
Courts must exercise special caution in granting summary judgment because “discrimination seldom announces itself openly” (Cadet-Legros v. New York Univ. Hosp. Ctr., 135 AD3d 196, 202 [1st Dept 2016]). The pertinent inquiry in any discrimination case is not whether the defendant’s decision to terminate the plaintiff was correct, but whether it was discriminatory (DeFina v. Meenan Oil Co., 924 F. Supp. 2d 423, 435 [E.D.N.Y. 2013]). The critical issue before the court is whether there is sufficient evidence by which a jury could find that the employer’s decision was discriminatory, not whether it was wise (Holleman v. Art Crating Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139916 [S.D.N.Y. 2014]). Therefore, a plaintiff’s subjective disagreement with the employer’s assessment of their performance is not actionable under the discrimination statutes (White v. Pacifica Found., 973 F. Supp. 2d 363, 382 [S.D.N.Y. 2013]). However, that same evaluation, when placed in context with other surrounding conduct, may reveal that the defendant’s actions were discriminatory.
In examining whether Defendants’ actions raise an inference of discrimination, this court finds that Defendants’ actions certainly raise a factual issue regarding whether their conduct was motivated by discriminatory animus. Plaintiff has suggested that his status as a Jewish man led Defendants to scrutinize his vacation requests more closely than they would have otherwise, and to call him at home to ensure his religious observance was genuine, among other actions. Plaintiff has credibly asserted that his allegations, in their totality, create a penumbra of uncertainty and factual divergence regarding Defendants’ stated rationale, which warrants resolution by a jury. Ultimately, a jury will be tasked with assessing the credibility of witnesses, while this court is confined to interpreting the applicable law.
In totality, the divergent account proffered by Plaintiff in opposition to Defendants’ prima facie showing underscores the existence of factual issues regarding plausible discrimination under the NYCHRL. Plaintiff has specifically pointed out that other Jewish male teachers, including himself, were all rated lower than their non-Jewish colleagues. This clearly meets Plaintiff’s burden under the NYCHRL and establishes that there are issues of fact pertaining to whether there was a legitimate reason for Plaintiff’s termination that was not permeated with a discriminatory intent. In addition, contrary to Defendants’ arguments, there is arguable temporal proximity sufficient to support an inference of discrimination and retaliation. To be sure, the negative observation occurred within about three weeks of the filing, and the decision to terminate within four weeks of the filing of the lawsuit. In addition, given Plaintiff’s overall effective rating, issues of fact pertaining to retaliation exist. Moreover, viewing the facts alleged in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, issues of fact also persist with respect to whether Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment.
In light of the following, the court concluded that “when put in context and viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, leads this court to the unmistakable conclusion that there are issues of fact that warrant a denial of Defendants’ motion” and that “[p]laintiff is entitled to have the facts of this case, underscored by competing accounts, resolved by a jury of his peers rather than determined by this court as a matter of law,” warranting denial of the instant motion.