In McWilson v. Bell Textron Inc., No. 4:23-cv-01104-P, 2024 WL 3585615 (N.D.Tex. July 30, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race-based hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
McWilson filed a timely EEOC charge for a single discrete act—the May 20, 2022, event in which Murphy “began making monkey sounds and pounding his chest in an effort to emulate the behavior of an ape.” ECF No. 25 at 4. McWilson reported the incident to Downing, but McWilson alleges Defendant took no actions to correct the abusive behavior of its employees. Id. at 4–5. Importantly, “a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that to be sufficiently severe to create a hostile work environment, something more is required than a ‘mere utterance of an … epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee.’ Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, McWilson’s hostile work environment claim must be subject to the continuing violation doctrine. See Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 850 F.3d 731,736 (5th Cir. 2017) (confirming the continuing violation doctrine applies only to hostile work environment claims).
Under the continuing violation doctrine, plaintiffs do not have to show all alleged discriminatory conduct occurred within the actionable period if they demonstrate a series of related discriminatory acts, one or more of which fall in the limitations period. See Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 2002). Discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time-barred, even when related to acts complained of in timely filed charges. See Nat’l R.R, 536 U.S. at 113. Some discrete acts are easy to identify, including “failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.” Id. at 114.
To demonstrate a continuing violation, plaintiffs must show that (1) the “separate acts” are related, (2) “the violation must be continuing; intervening action by the employer, among other things, will sever the acts that preceded it from those subsequent to it,” and (3) that the doctrine is tempered by the court’s equitable powers, so applying the continuing violation doctrine must “honor Title VII’s remedial purpose.” Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 329 (5th Cir. 2009).
The question here is whether the pre-March 11, 2022, events support the application of the continuing violation doctrine. First, concerning relatedness, McWilson experienced the same type of harassment from the same employee. See ECF No. 25 at 3–5. Thus, McWilson has carried his burden respecting the first element. Second, McWilson sufficiently alleges that the violation was ongoing. Murphy’s threat occurred on April 8, 2021. ECF No. 25 at 3. McWilson reported the incident to HR, and after substantiating part of McWilson’s claim, Defendant chose not to act. See id. McWilson then found dents in his toolbox, which he alleges were caused by Murphy. Id. at 4. While the First Amended Complaint is vague as to what occurs next, it lays out facts to suggest that Murphy repeatedly targeted McWilson, making him fear for his safety and entirely alter his behavior at work to avoid interacting with Murphy. Id. During this time, Defendant received multiple reports from McWilson and his union representative, and as alleged, Defendant failed to intervene. Id. at 4–5. These facts demonstrate repeated harassment “based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.” Nat’l R.R., 536 U.S. at 115. The very definition of a hostile work environment.Further, no actions by Defendant severed these separate actions. Merely investigating the reported misconduct is insufficient to destroy the continuing nature of the hostile environment, as Defendant contends. See ECF No. 30 at 2. Rather, a continuing violation is severed when employers take “prompt remedial action to protect the claimant” by reprimanding the harasser or reassigning the claimant to a different supervisor. Stewart, 586 F.3d at 329. Making all reasonable assumptions in favor of McWilson, the changes to McWilson’s routine that did occur appear to arise from McWilson’s choice and not that of Defendant’s intervention. See ECF No. 25 at 4, 12. Thus, no intervening act severed the continuing nature of the claim.
Third, McWilson repeatedly tried to remedy the situation by avoiding Murphy and reporting the conduct. See ECF 25 at 4–5. Yet, Defendant allegedly took no remedial action during McWilson’s employment. See id. Further, Defendant provides no equitable considerations that would prevent the Court from applying the full scope of the continuing violation doctrine. See Heath, 850 F.3d at 741. Thus, making all inferences in favor of the nonmovant, the Court concludes that the continuing violation doctrine applies.
Therefore, being a continuing violation, the totality of the circumstances plausibly supports a hostile work environment claim.
The court concluded that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a hostile work environment, noting his allegations that he was subject to unwanted race-based harassment, that the employer knew of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action, and that plaintiff experienced repeated threats and harassment, causing him to alter his route to work and actively avoid the alleged harasser.