In Singh v. Meetup LLC et al, 23-CV-9502 (JPO), 2024 WL 3904799 (S.D.N.Y. August 22, 2024), the court granted defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) did not apply, since plaintiff’s allegations – while arguably constituting discrimination based on sex, did not constitute sexual harassment within the meaning of the pertinent statutes.
After discussing the subtle, yet here dispositive, differences between “discrimination based on sex” and “sexual harassment” under the New York City Human Rights Law, the court concluded:
Considering all of this evidence of the meaning of “sexual harassment” as opposed to the broader category of “gender discrimination” under NYCHRL, the Court concludes that Singh has failed to plausibly allege that she experienced “sexual harassment” while employed at Meetup. Singh alleges that Siegel mistreated her by “crediting male employees with some of her accomplishments, ignoring her contributions and/or claiming them as his own, assigning projects to male employees over her, and interrupting her in meetings.” (FAC ¶¶ 65-67.) She further alleges that Siegel “inappropriately questioned” whether Singh’s pregnancy would impact her commitment to her job and whether she had plans to come back to work and had set up childcare for her return. (Id. ¶ 79.) Siegel allegedly did not ask a male employee in a similar role these questions when he took parental leave. (Id.) And finally, Singh alleges that Defendants “harassed” her on the basis of gender “by subjecting her to false and baseless performance criticisms as a pretext for her termination during her maternity leave.” (Id. ¶ 100.)
These actions directed at Singh, assumed to be true at this stage of litigation, surely constitute gender discrimination under the NYCHRL. But not all gender discrimination is sexual harassment. And while Singh asserts that she was “subjected to a hostile work environment” and “harassed” by Siegel’s mistreatment of her, such conclusory labels are not dispositive—and do not alter the facts alleged.
The court concluded that the plaintiff “has not alleged harassing conduct or the kind of inappropriate comments that would rise to what the courts have determined constitutes ‘sexual harassment’ under the NYCHRL” and that “[h]olding otherwise would collapse the difference between ‘gender discrimination’ and ‘sexual harassment,’ a step too far for this Court absent contrary guidance from the state courts” and, therefore, that plaintiff’s claims failed to trigger the EFAA.