In Wright v. City of New York et al, 23 Civ. 3149 (KPF), 2024 WL 3952722 (S.D.N.Y. August 27, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claims asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.
In sum, the court alleges that she was discriminated and retaliated against after returning to in-person work from a COVID-19 work accommodation.
From the decision:
Plaintiff’s claim under the ADA is governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). “To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must make four showings: that ‘[i] she engaged in a protected activity; [ii] her employer was aware of this activity; [iii] the employer took adverse employment action against her; and [iv] a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity.’ ” Id. (quoting Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 353 (2d Cir. 2019).
Retaliation victims are provided with broader protection under the NYCHRL — and, for purposes of this motion, under the post-amendment NYSHRL — than their federal counterpart. The elements of a prima facie case of retaliation under the three statutes are identical, “except that the plaintiff need not prove any ‘adverse’ employment action; instead, [she] must prove that something happened that would be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity.” Leon v. Columbia Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 11 Civ. 8559 (NSR), 2013 WL 6669415, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Stinson v. Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC, No. 22 Civ. 6164 (JLR), 2024 WL 3848515, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2024) (collecting cases).
Under both standards, the Complaint adequately pleads a claim for retaliation. Beginning with the first element of Plaintiff’s federal claim, which is the more stringent, “protected activity” includes formal or informal complaints, protesting, or opposing statutorily prohibited discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (ADA); see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e) (stating a “protected activity,” as an element of a prima facie case for retaliation under the NYSHRL, refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination); Leroy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 36 F.4th 469, 477 (2d Cir. 2022) (NYCHRL). A plaintiff “need not prove that her underlying complaint of discrimination had merit but only that it was motivated by a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying employment practice was unlawful.” Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Requesting reasonable accommodations for a disability may also constitute a protected activity. See Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that a retaliation claim may be based on a request for reasonable accommodation); see also Jenkins v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 646 F. Supp. 2d 464, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims that Ramos retaliated against her after she “return[ed] to work in person” from her accommodation and “lodged complaints of discrimination,” constitute protected activity. (Pl. Opp. 20; see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 38 (alleging that Plaintiff met with Torres-Hulla in late-March 2022 “regarding the discrimination she was experiencing”), 44 (alleging that on or around May 17, 2022, Plaintiff emailed Torres-Hulla “regarding the discrimination and retaliation”)). Moreover, the Complaint alleges facts that demonstrate that Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s accommodation and complaints, thus satisfying the second element. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 44).
With regard to the third element, Plaintiff’s Complaint is replete with allegations of retaliatory conduct that fall within the relevant limitations periods, including: Ramos issuing a disciplinary letter and denying Plaintiff tenure after Plaintiff lodged complaints regarding discrimination (Compl. ¶ 44); refusing to renew Plaintiff’s job as assistant principal and demoting her to a teacher’s position “only if she signed a release barring [her] from bringing any claims against Defendants” (id. ¶ 48); and, on or about August 18, 2022, constructively discharging Plaintiff (id. ¶ 49). See Sivio v. Vill. Care Max, 436 F. Supp. 3d 778, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Termination … is obviously an adverse employment action.”); see also Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 316 (“[D]emotion constitutes an adverse employment action.”); United States v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 407 F. Supp. 3d 365, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding disciplinary letters relating to plaintiff’s absences and performances, which clearly had a deleterious effect on plaintiff’s employment, “constituted an adverse action”).
Finally, Plaintiff alleges a causal connection between the retaliatory actions and both her return from leave and her filing of complaints. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 27 (alleging that after Plaintiff returned from her leave due to her accommodation, Ramos began “taking away” her assistant principal duties), 44 (alleging that Plaintiff’s emails to Torres-Hulla regarding the discrimination on or around May 2022 were closely followed by a disciplinary letter and a denial of tenure in June 2022)). Temporal proximity alone is sufficient to show a causal connection when, as here, “the protected activity and alleged retaliation occurred ‘very close’ in time.’ ” N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 407 F. Supp. 3d at 408.
The court thus concluded that “drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged claims for retaliation” and denied defendants’ motion as to plaintiff’s retaliation claims.