In De Longchamp v. Equinox Holdings Co., Inc., No. 153431/2021 (N.Y. Sup Ct, New York County Sep. 04, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims of retaliation against defendant Equinox under the New York State Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
Plaintiff has, however, met his de minimis initial burden on his retaliation claim as against Equinox, since he engaged in the protected activity of complaining about Gecht’s conduct to Kwon; Equinox knew of same; plaintiff was terminated; and plaintiff has “proffered admissible evidence [that] would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer a retaliatory motive” (Jute v Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F3d 166, 173 [2nd Cir 2005])–namely, he testified that Whigham indicated that he disapproved of plaintiff complaining about Gecht and that this may have influenced his decision to terminate him some months later (Raniola v Bratton, 243 F3d 610, 624 [2nd Cir 2001] [“The plaintiff’s burden at the beginning of the case is a light one, usually demanding only that the protected activity preceded the adverse action in order to satisfy the causation requirement.”]). The presumption of retaliation therefore arose, and the burden shifts to Equinox “to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for” terminating plaintiff (id.). Equinox did articulate a legitimate reason, citing plaintiff’s delay in notifying Whigham of a behavioral incident; addressing prospective members as “losers” in an email; violating the free club service policies; and repeatedly failing to ensure proper staffing at the club (NYSCEF Doc No 62). “The burden shifts, therefore, back to the plaintiff to establish, through either direct or circumstantial evidence, that the employer’s action was, in fact, motivated by discriminatory retaliation” (id. at 625). “A plaintiff can sustain this burden by proving that a retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment actions even if it was not the sole cause; if the employer was motivated by retaliatory animus, [the NYSHRL] is violated even if there were objectively valid grounds for the adverse employment action” (Hicks v Baines, 593 F3d 159, 164-65 [2nd Cir 2010] [internal quotation omitted]).
Plaintiff raises several noteworthy issues: (i) despite his prior promotion, plaintiff’s standing with the club quickly declined around the time that he complained about Gecht’s conduct; (ii) other employees who violated company policies–but who did not lodge discrimination complaints–were not terminated, and in Gecht’s case, were even promoted; and (iii) the decision to terminate plaintiff ostensibly relied, at least in part, on his former supervisor’s evaluations of his performance which were allegedly tainted by bias (NYSCEF Doc No 101). Considering these circumstantial issues in the aggregate, and in viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, these issues are sufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether Equinox’s decision to terminate plaintiff was, in even some small measure, motivated by retaliatory animus (Cronin v Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F3d 196, 203 [2nd Cir 1995] [“plaintiff is not required to show that the employer’s proffered reasons were false or played no role in the employment decision, but only that they were not the only reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the ‘motivating’ factors”]). Equinox’s assertion that Gecht’s opinions of plaintiff had no bearing on its decision to terminate plaintiff is insufficient to eliminate these questions of fact, as the decision could have been based on the mere fact that plaintiff lodged a complaint.
Based on this, the court denied Equinox’s motion for summary judgment.