Section 1981 Race Discrimination Claim, Based on Shift Change Denial, Sufficiently Alleged

In Robert L. Miller, Jr. v. Ascenda USA Incorporated, et al., No. CV-22-02172-PHX-JJT, 2024 WL 4241552 (D.Ariz. Sept. 19, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of race discrimination asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

After dismissing plaintiff’s claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies at the EEOC, the court explained:

By contrast, § 1981 claims of discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity do not require that a plaintiff first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). The statute of limitations period for § 1981 claims is four years from the date of the alleged act of discrimination. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004). Section 1981 “prohibits discrimination in the ‘benefits, privileges, terms and conditions’ of employment.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)). To prevail on a § 1981 claim, “a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, [he] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020).

Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim is premised on alleged acts taking place within four years before he filed the Complaint in this matter, so the claim is not time-barred. The question is rather whether Plaintiff has adequately pled facts plausibly supporting the inference that he would not have suffered the adverse employment actions he alleges but for his race. This inquiry is complicated by the fact that Plaintiff also brings an ADA discrimination claim premised on his alleged disability; in certain instances in the TAC, it is not clear whether Plaintiff alleges the but for cause of discrimination was his alleged disability or his race. (E.g., TAC ¶ 75 (Defendant did not accommodate Plaintiff’s medical information requests related to his alleged disability where “[r]esearch will verify that younger, light-skinned agents with disabilities” were not treated the same).) But at least certain allegations only focus on racial discrimination—just as certain allegations only focus on disability discrimination, as noted above. For example, Plaintiff alleges that, in 2019, he was not granted the same shift change requests as agents “who were not dark-skinned.” (TAC ¶ 21.)

Based on this, the court found that plaintiff has alleged enough at this stage of the litigation to state a claim for racial discrimination under § 1981.

Share This: