In Bray v. Rhythm Management Group, LLC, 2024 Wl 4278989 (D. Md. Sept. 24, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.
From the decision:
Defendants assert that Bray’s allegations do not describe conduct sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to alter the conditions of her employment and “create an abusive or hostile atmosphere.” EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 175 (4th Cir. 2009). This element has both subjective and objective components. Id. As to the subjective component, the plaintiff must have subjectively perceived the environment to be hostile or abusive. Id. Where Bray has asserted that she repeatedly notified Aldrich leadership of Moultry’s harassment and sought corrective action, she has satisfied this subjective requirement. See id. at 176 (finding that a plaintiff’s emotional distress and complaints to supervisors met the subjective component).
In assessing whether the environment “was objectively severe or pervasive,” courts “must look at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. (quoting EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008)); see Parker v. Reema Consulting Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 297, 304 (4th Cir. 2019). No “single factor is dispositive” because the “real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships.” Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d at 176 (citations omitted).
Bray’s allegations meet this standard. Bray recounts a series of incidents of sexual harassment by Moultry, who repeatedly made unwelcome and sexually suggestive comments and innuendos about Bray and her appearance. These comments were made directly to Bray in person and via text message, and they were also made to Bray’s colleagues. Bray also alleges that Moultry inappropriately touched and adjusted his private parts in front of her. Notably, Moultry’s harassment also extended to other women in the office, which is a relevant consideration in a hostile work environment inquiry. See Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that conduct directed at persons other than the plaintiff may be considered in hostile work environment claims). Particularly where a “work environment consumed by remarks that intimidate, ridicule, and maliciously demean the status of women can create an environment that is as hostile as an environment that contains unwanted sexual advances,” Moultry’s conduct, taken together, was sufficiently pervasive to create an abusive atmosphere. See EEOC v. R&R Ventures, 244 F.3d 334, 340 (4th Cir. 2001) (denying summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim where a supervisor repeatedly made inappropriate remarks about his sex life and other workers’ bodies); Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 205, 209–10 (4th Cir. 2014) (denying summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim where co-workers made repeated, inappropriate sex-based comments); cf. Jennings v. Univ. of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 696–97 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding under a parallel standard for a hostile environment under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 that a soccer coach’s repeated inquiries into players’ sex lives and comments on their bodies were sufficiently severe or pervasive to preclude summary judgment).
Beyond the harassment by Moultry, Bray also faced weekly incidents of hostility by her supervisor, Baig. Bray alleges that this hostility is based on sex because she did not see Baig engage in such hostile and derogatory conduct toward men, and she has alleged facts demonstrating that this conduct unreasonably interfered with her work performance, as she has asserted that she stopped meeting with her supervisor alone out of fear for her safety. See Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a supervisor’s ongoing harassment, which consisted of repeated intimidating, belittling, and maliciously demeaning remarks based on the plaintiff’s gender, was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment). Baig’s conduct, when considered along with Moultry’s sexual harassment, bolsters the Court’s conclusion that Bray has sufficiently alleged severe or pervasive harassment establishing an abusive atmosphere.
The court further explained that plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts to demonstrate that the sexual harassment may be imputed to defendants.