In Sanchez v. New York City Housing Authority, 23-CV-8683 (JMF), 2024 WL 5119372 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2024), the court, inter alia, granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s sex-based hostile work environment claims.
From the decision:
Next, Sanchez brings a hostile work environment claim under Title VII. To survive summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must “produce evidence that the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.” Banks v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242, 261 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). Significantly, however, “[b]eyond demonstrating a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show a basis for imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer” in order to hold the employer liable under Title VII. Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Del Villar v. Hyatt Hotel Corp., No. 19-CV-10891 (JMF), 2022 WL 2316205, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2022). Where, as here, the plaintiff alleges misconduct by a co-worker rather than a supervisor, the employer is liable “only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013). In particular, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint or that it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the harassment yet failed to take appropriate remedial action.” Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, assuming arguendo that Jordan’s comments and Ward’s alleged physical contact with Sanchez were more than mere “isolated acts” and could “meet the threshold of severity or pervasiveness” to constitute a hostile work environment — a dubious assumption — there is no basis to impute these actions to NYCHA. See Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373-74 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing cases). Sanchez does not contend that NYCHA “failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint or that it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the harassment yet failed to take appropriate remedial action.” Summa, 708 F.3d at 124. Indeed, as discussed above, it is undisputed that NYCHA took action each time that Sanchez reported an incident involving Jordan. See Pl.’s SOMF ¶¶ 50, 72, 98-99. NYCHA also took actions to investigate the Ward incident, speaking with Sanchez and referring the investigation to DEO. See Pl.’s SOMF ¶¶ 101-02. Once DEO learned that Ward had been arrested and charged with sexual abuse by the police, however, DEO did not investigate further in accordance with its standard operating procedures for dealing with criminal conduct. See Pl.’s SOMF ¶¶ 103-05. Accordingly, there is no basis for imputing any of these acts to NYCHA.
The court further declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims asserted under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws, and thus dismissed those claims without prejudice to refiling in state court.